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THESIS

THE KING AND THE SHAH:
MODERNIZATION, DEPENDENCE AND REGIME STABILITY

by

John Charles Wright

June 1985

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The King and the Shah:
Modernization, Dependence and Regime Stability

by

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Critics of America's support for conservative monarchs in the Middle East have pointed out disturbing parallels between the current situation in Morocco and conditions that existed in Iran prior to the fall of the shah. The purpose of this thesis is to assess the validity of such comparisons.

The author analyses the forces leading to revolution in Iran in terms of five categories: domestic, Islamic, leadership, economic and foreign. The stability of the Moroccan regime is then assessed using these categories as a guide. Because of its clear bearing on future developments in the country, Morocco's war in the Western Sahara is also discussed even though it falls outside of the categories drawn from the Iranian experience.

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I. INTRODUCTION

A. OVERVIEW

"Iran, because of the great leadership of the shah, is an island of stability in one of the most troubled areas of the world." [Ref. 1: pp 7-9] This toast, delivered by President Carter to the Shah of Iran at the Niavaran Palace in Tehran on New Years Eve 1977, soon returned to haunt the United States. In only a year, the shah would be forced into exile, condemned to live out his remaining days as a stateless pariah, helpless while his country and its institutions fell into total collapse¹ [Ref. 2: pp.86-7].

In 1981 and 1984, riots swept through the Kingdom of Morocco. Among the slogans shouted by the rioting crowds was this chilling Arabic play on the name of Morocco's ruler, King Hassan II: "Shah the first, Hassan the second!" [Ref. 3: p. 31] Such anti-regime sentiments seemed to confirm the fears of critics of America's support for the region's conservative monarchs, who were troubled by the similarities between the shah and the king. They contend

¹The Shah of Iran was the second of America's "three kings" to fall in the 1970s. For the preceding 25 years, the U.S. had maintained mutually supportive relationships, under what the State Department termed the "three kings' principle", with the monarchies of Iran, Saudi Arabia and Ethiopia. In addition, Morocco, Pakistan, and on occasion Jordan had joined in the relationship.

that close association with the United States stimulates domestic and international opposition to King Hassan's regime. In addition, they argue that the "intense and demonstrative" nature of U.S. support for the Moroccan monarchy works in opposition to America's other important interests in North Africa, such as its growing commercial relationship with Algeria [Ref. 4: p. 6].

King Hassan must resolve problems associated with the forces of modernization as well as problems related to his country's condition of structural dependence. In that sense, the analogy between the king and the shah is apt. This thesis will examine the validity of this analogy by assessing the similarities and the differences between conditions in Morocco and pre-revolutionary Iran. It should be noted, however, that the primary purpose of this thesis is to assess the stability of the Moroccan regime. Therefore, conditions in Morocco will be discussed in somewhat greater detail than those in Iran. The impact of the conflict in the Western Sahara, although outside of the Iran/Morocco comparison, will also receive attention because of the problems it presents for Morocco's king.

B. METHODOLOGY

Numerous policy makers, policy analysts, academics and members of the popular press have analyzed the causes of the Iranian Revolution. Despite considerable differences of

political perspective, most analysts are in relative agreement on the conditions which led to the shah's fall. However, as Professor Robert Looney has pointed out, these conventional explanations for the Iranian revolution are built on a tautological argument; i.e., "the revolution occurred because all the conditions for revolution were present." [Ref. 5: pp. 254-5]

This thesis does not presume to explain the genuine root causes of the Iranian revolution, instead it seeks to outline the conditions generally conceded to have made it inevitable. For our purposes, a simple characterization of the factors which were preconditions for revolution in Iran is adequate. By comparing these factors to conditions in Morocco in the same categories, it should be possible to assess the validity of the analogies drawn between King Hassan and the Shah of Iran.

I believe that the comparison will show that the similarities between the two monarchs are somewhat overstated. On careful examination, the Moroccan monarchy's "doomsday clock" does not stand at two minutes to midnight. King Hassan, throughout his reign has consistently bought the time required to continue the gradual modernization of his nation while postponing the inevitable conflict when modern ideals clash with traditional interests.

Before proceeding with the comparison between Morocco and Iran, we must understand the environment with which the

two traditional rulers had to cope. Its most significant features, from the regime-stability perspective, are related to the process of modernization and the condition of dependency. The following chapter will describe the links between these phenomena and how they effected royal authority in Morocco and Iran.

II. MODERNIZATION AND DEPENDENCY

A. MODERNIZATION

In the view of former Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, the fall of the shah was a classic example of the clash between traditional and modern authority [Ref. 6: p. 345]. The far-reaching changes wrought on Iranian society by the country's windfall oil wealth, the almost overnight growth in the size of its industrial and military establishments, the increasing occurrence of corruption in official life, all had a tremendous impact on Iran's traditional patterns.

A Pakistani poet, Faiz Ahmed Faiz, likened the impact of modernization on Islamic society to the "shattering of the glass." [Ref. 7: pp. 31-2] In the aftermath of the Iranian revolution, it's clear that modernization, not Islam, bore the brunt of the shattering impact. The inevitability of the clash between modernization and tradition is at the heart of the problem Samuel Huntington describes as the "king's dilemma." [Ref. 8: p. 177]

The "king's dilemma" has particular relevance to rulers such as King Hassan and the Shah of Iran. Huntington, a leading spokesman of moderate conservative thought, coined the term to describe the situation confronting reforming rulers in traditional society. Huntington argues that the

reforming monarch's regime is inevitably threatened by forces of modernity emanating from the very reforms he originated. His classic work Political Order in Changing Societies provides the basis for the discussion of the problems of modernizing monarchs which follows.

1. Impact on Stability

Huntington argues that there is a strong correlation between political instability and rapid social change. Although modernity once attained breeds stability, the process of modernization and reform breeds instability. In his view, the degree of instability is related to the rate of modernization. However, the failure to modernize creates an even worse situation. The ruler who chooses not to modernize faces the prospect of chronic instability, characteristic of a backward society and a constant need to exercise despotic power to control that society and sustain his crown. In addition, a variety of pressures originating from domestic and international sources encourage rulers to modernize.

1. Security considerations. Existing regimes often inaugurate reforms themselves to avoid being overthrown, replaced, or entirely displaced (i.e., Turkey after WWI, Egypt after Palestine failure). Thus, reform is often the "child of military failure." Conversely, successful reform, particularly the centralization of power, increases the likelihood of military success.
2. Domestic pressure. The principle threat to the stability of traditional societies comes from within. In the 20th century, monarchs reform not so much to

thwart imperialism as to thwart revolution. The king must counter the invasion of foreign ideas, not foreign armies. Rulers naturally conclude that if they do not modernize, someone else will. [Ref. 8: pp. 155-6]

Once the king decides to initiate a modernizing process, he can follow one of two courses. He can opt for a controlled, top-down modernization process with himself at the helm; or he can choose to be less directly involved by initiating reforms that promote modernization via a constitutional system where both power and authority are shared. [Ref. 7: p. 42]

The shah and King Hassan, like most modern monarchs, tried to have it both ways. Both tried out various versions of parliamentary monarchy. However, neither was willing to take steps that would result in any significant devolution of their power. In reality, therefore, the shah and the king became the chief forces for modernization within their countries.

According to Huntington, monarchs committed to modernization must first effect the transfer of power from traditional power centers (i.e., regional, aristocratic, religious, and ethnic) to central national institutions, and then concentrate authority in a single individual (the king) within those institutions. One critical struggle that usually develops pits the "modernizing" monarch against his "traditional" bureaucracy. Until the bureaucracy is "converted", the monarch can not effectively implement

modernizing measures. An even more critical struggle occurs between the monarch and previously autonomous centers of traditional power such as the mullahs in Iran and the marabouts in Morocco. A state is not truly modern until these struggles have been won so that claims of state and nation take priority over the "more parochial claims of family, class and clan." [Ref. 8: pp. 156-7]

The subordination of such timeworn traditional claims requires a fundamental shift in values. In the process, traditional man transfers his loyalty and identification from immediate groups such as family and clan to larger, more impersonal groups such as class and nation. At the intellectual level, social mobilization involves a tremendous increase in knowledge. Demographically, mobilization leads to increased life expectancy, greater geographic mobility and extreme changes in the pattern of life. In sum, social mobilization is the process by which the old commitments are broken, and people, as a consequence of literacy, education, media exposure, mass communications and urbanization, begin to adopt the values and aspirations of the modern world.

The process of modernization, of course, requires not only aspirations but capabilities. Thus social mobilization must be accompanied by economic development for modernization to take place. In almost every case, social, economic and cultural modernization change and eventually

destroy the traditional political system. However this does not necessarily result in movement toward modern political systems. Huntington identifies three characteristic indicators of the change from a traditional to a modern polity.

First, political modernization requires the rationalization of authority. By replacing traditional, religious and ethnic political authorities with a single, secular national political authority, modernization implies that government is the product of men, not God. Secondly, modern polities may be distinguished by differentiation of structure. This is achieved by developing autonomous but subordinate structures to accomplish functions that had been in the political realm. In differentiated structures, office and power are distributed by achievement, not ascription. Finally, political modernization entails expansion of political participation by social groups throughout the society. Note that broadened participation not only enhances control of the government by the people in democratic states, but also works to enhance the control of the people by the government in totalitarian states. Thus, political participation and democracy are not synonymous. [Ref. 8: p. 34]

2. The King's Dilemma

The gap between theory and the actual political effects of social, economic and cultural modernization is often vast. In the Islamic world, mobilization, economic

development and to some extent political participation have occurred to varying degrees. However, with the exception of Israel, the Middle East offers no examples where rationalized authority and differentiated political structures have truly endured. [Ref. 8: p. 35]

The gap which typically exists between social and political development increases the potential for conflict between traditional and modern elements of society. The process of social mobilization continues to create new groups of elites, increasingly well-educated and exposed to Western ideas and values. Their modern aspirations, often based on an inflated estimation of their own achievements, directly conflict with those of the traditional elites, whose authority is inherited. Many of the conflicts eventually erupt into violence. This explains why much of the modernizing world is characterized by coups, revolts and a tendency toward autocratic, one-party regimes. These conditions have led to a certain pessimism about the future of royal authority.

The various pressures which compel the king to modernize in effect seal the eventual doom of the crown in the following way. First, the modernizing monarch must seize and centralize the power formerly held by such traditional forces as the church, landholding aristocrats and perhaps tribal chiefs. Then he must develop a modern bureaucracy that shares his goals and maintains a corporate

interest separate from that of the traditional factions. Since this new bureaucracy is likely to be drawn from segments of society other than its traditional layers, increased social and political mobility are associated with modernization. The bureaucracy and the monarchy are pitted on one side against the religious, aristocratic and tribal opposition on the other. The goals of the latter groups, of course, are to preserve traditional society and their privileged position in it. Ironically, the traditional forces often espouse such modernizing values as liberty, constitutionalism and representative government as a method of blocking the monarch's efforts at centralization and reform. With the cooperation of the new "intelligentsia", traditionalists try to associate liberty with traditional pluralism in the ensuing struggle against the "despotic" equality of the reforming monarch. [Ref. 8: p. 160]

Even if the king is successful in the initial phase of his struggle with the traditional forces, there is always the danger that power will eventually become too concentrated in the monarchy to allow society to assimilate the forces unleashed by reform. This is the crux of the "king's dilemma." Without the authority of the monarch the reforms could never have been launched. Yet the success of those reforms undermines the legitimacy of the traditional monarch who may have had to suspend elections, parliament and political parties to effect modernization. Thus, the

modernizing monarch finds himself the prisoner of institutions which made modernization possible. Able to transform society, but unable to transform itself, the monarchy is eventually devoured by its modern progeny. In the end, the king is victim of his own success. [Ref. 8: p. 177]

Typical observations about monarchies in the Islamic world are that they are fragile, not deeply rooted, indivisible and incompatible with modern values [Ref. 9: p. 167]. Historical evidence reinforces this gloomy assessment of the prospects for monarchs. The list of Islam's fallen monarchs has grown at a steady rate: Egypt, 1952; Tunisia, 1956; Iraq, 1958; Yemen, 1962; South Arabia, 1967; Libya, 1969; Afghanistan, 1973; and Iran, 1979. Nonetheless, those monarchies which remain appear to be remarkably resilient.

Michael Hudson lists the following attributes of the perfectly legitimized, ideal Islamic monarchy, a monarchy entirely congruent with the values of the traditional political culture.

1. The monarchy would take the form of an Islamic theocracy, governed by the ablest leaders of a tribe tracing its lineage to the prophet.
2. The ruler's authority would rest not only in his coercive power but in the respect of his people for a leader on the right path.
3. The principle criterion for the ruler's legitimate authority would be his personal adherence to religious standards and kinship loyalties, not the office or institution of kingship itself. [Ref. 9: p. 167]

Neither the shah nor King Hassan closely resemble this ideal. Both rulers have relied on their coercive powers to a far greater extent than any authority they might derive as "father figures." King Hassan has thus far managed to postpone the challenge posed by the "king's dilemma." The shah, on the other hand, tried to use his vast oil wealth to circumvent this challenge. Nonetheless, he eventually had to face the forces unleashed by modernization. At that point he hesitated to use his coercive power and was destroyed by those forces which were largely of his own creation.

B. DEPENDENCY

The situation of structural dependency that exists for the nations of the developing world aggravates the already serious problems modernization poses for reform-minded rulers. In the Middle East, a pattern of unequal exchange has typified relationships between the major European powers and the relatively weak local states since the colonial era. Although Morocco and Iran retained their nominal sovereignty throughout the age of empire, neither has ever been truly free to set its own course as an independent actor in the international system.

The French formula of protectorate in Morocco had only provided Moroccans with what Marshall Lyautey described as the "illusion of independence." [Ref. 10: p. 16] Although

the French officially acknowledged the sovereignty of the sultan, the country was in fact ruled for over 40 years by the French resident general. The Treaty of Fez, imposed upon Morocco by the French in 1912, stripped the sultan of the real attributes of sovereignty. The treaty stipulated that the sultan was no longer responsible for his country's foreign policy, its internal government or its defense. His only power was negative, in that he could refuse to assent to the laws proposed by the resident general thereby impeding their implementation. [Ref. 10: p. 17]

Unlike Morocco, or for that matter most of the Middle East, Iran was never under the direct control of a colonial power. Nonetheless, Iran's freedom of political maneuver was also severely limited. Both Great Britain and Russia exercised considerable influence over Iran's royal court in the 19th century. The two imperial powers continually conspired against each other and, with the collusion of the corrupt Qajar dynasty, were able to squelch any independent Persian foreign policy initiatives. The British sought to guarantee their transportation routes across the Persian Gulf to India as well as provide a buffer against Russian aggression for the jewel of the empire. The Russians cast avaricious eyes on Iran as a step on their historic march toward warm waters. [Ref. 11: p. 7]

In this century Great Britain, Russia, Germany and the United States have had immense influence over Iran's

domestic political affairs. When Reza Shah (father of Iran's last shah) deposed the last Qajar in 1926, his goals were to restore Persian greatness and to end the foreign interference which had marked the Qajars' reign. However, he misjudged the effect his apparent pro-German sympathies prior to the outbreak of World War II would have on Allied willingness to intervene in Iran's internal and external affairs once hostilities began. The Allied Powers jointly occupied Iran forcing Reza Shah to abdicate in favor of his son in 1941. Mohammed Reza Shah immediately assumed his father's throne, doomed by his age (21) and inexperience to reign as the virtual puppet of the Western Allies. [Ref. 12: pp. 54-7]

1. The Psychology of Dependence

While it had to be recognized that the West was the prime mover in bringing about the Arab awakening, in introducing sanitation, education and other mass benefits into the Arab world, the West assumed for the Arab mind the character of a sinister jinni, a hateful enemy, and a convenient whipping-boy who could be blamed for all the problems that beset the Arabs. [Ref. 13: p. 300]

The psychological impact of structural dependence in the Middle East has produced a phenomenon described by Raphael Patai as the "Arab inferiority complex." [Ref. 13: p. 313] It is important to emphasize that this phenomenon did not end with independence. Patai makes the case that the West actually managed to increase its cultural influence

in the Middle East as its political influence weakened. [Ref. 13: pp. 273-4] Western influence grew despite Morocco's full independence from France in 1956 and despite Iran's military and economic dominance of the region. The fact remained that both Iran and Morocco entered the last quarter of the 20th century deeply penetrated by external powers and still struggling with imperialism's legacy. Virtually every expert writing of the revolution has concluded that the weight of this burden was an important factor in the shah's downfall. Although Morocco's colonial legacy and dependency are of a slightly different nature, the manner in which Morocco's king carries his burden will influence regime stability there as well.

In Morocco, dependency after "independence" followed the classic pattern: direct investment in the most strategic sectors of the economy, asymmetrical trade relations, heavy financial reliance on sources controlled by the center, military cooperation and training programs, and various cultural and economic mechanisms. [Ref. 14: p. 9] Iran, because of its oil wealth, was able to avoid some of the symptoms of economic dependency. Nonetheless, Iran's overall dependency in its relations with center nations was virtually as pronounced as Morocco's.

Galtung describes dependency as an unequal exchange between center and peripheral nations in the following five categories: economic, political, military, communication

and cultural [Ref. 15: p. 9]. Conditions in both pre-revolutionary Iran and Morocco seem consistent with this pattern. Both nations occupy structural positions in the international system that require them to rely on center nations for:

1. Political decision models (theoretically "constitutional" monarchies, parliaments, free elections, etc.).
2. Military equipment (primarily French and American for Morocco, primarily American for Iran).
3. Means of communication (both are reliant on Western technology).
4. System of education (European education a must for elite status).

This degree of penetration has led to more than just extreme economic and socio-political distortions. Frantz Fanon has noted among the formerly colonized² a willingness to admit the inferiority of their own culture [Ref. 16: p. 236]. This denial of one's own heritage is in part a result of the dominant powers' deliberate attempts to destroy the colonized's links with their own history [Ref. 17: p. 112].

The imperial powers displayed a fundamentally chauvinistic attitude toward the indigenous society. The idea of uplifting the masses, as expressed in concepts like the "mission civilisatrice" for the French or the "white man's burden" for the British, provided the ethical justification

²Fanon uses the word colonized in its normative rather than literal sense.

for imperialist intervention [Ref. 9: p. 121]. The center nations' barely masked contempt for the native populations and local culture is typified by the French word "evolue", an incredible term meaning evolved to a higher state when applied to francophile natives [Ref. 18: p. 214].

The tendency toward self-hatred on the part of the colonized is exacerbated by the apparent powerlessness of the dominated culture to retain its own identity. The attraction of Western superiority in all material, economic, technological and organizational fields has proven irresistible. The path of modernization requires imitation of Western methods in all of these fields. To do so inevitably leads to embracing selected Western values while it requires adjusting or abandoning an equivalent number of traditional beliefs.

As Fanon points out, it is organically impossible for "a culture to modify any one of its customs without at the same time re-evaluating its deepest values, its most stable models." [Ref. 19: pp. 41-2] Dependency on the West, an unavoidable by-product of the modernizing process, has disrupted many of Islam's traditional priorities. From the Islamic perspective, the counter-acculturation process produces a conflict between Western values, which are felt to be clearly secondary, and such true values as religion and morality. Local people are left with the suspicion that by imitating the West they are debasing themselves. At the

same time they realize that they can never stop imitating the West if they wish to continue to modernize. This is the root of the "Arab inferiority complex." Forced to import Western criteria, the overwhelming margin of Western superiority undercuts their self-esteem and underscores their impotence. [Ref. 13: pp. 297-300]

In Morocco and Iran, the growing irrelevance of the mother tongues typifies the sorts of dislocations that arise from the clash between modern and traditional societies.³ Although both countries have gone to some lengths to enhance the use of Arabic and Farsi, fluency in French, English or German is a prerequisite for elite status in either nation. Exposure to Western languages, methods and values has gradually weakened the hold of traditional beliefs and customs. Such developments have created ambivalent feelings among the members of these changing societies. As much as aspiring "moderns" admire Western methods and desire the Western trappings of modernization, they can not help but resent being born as strangers in their own lands, lands increasingly dominated by the values of foreign cultures.

³While reliable figures are difficult to obtain, Professor Marvin Zonis, author of The Political Elite of Iran, states that more than half the population of Iran speaks as a native tongue a language other than Farsi (Persian).

The ensuing love-hate relationship with the West, a product of structural dependence, manifests itself most prominently on the national level in terms of foreign policy. As will later be illustrated for both countries, structural dependence has simultaneously bred acquiescence and resistance. [Ref.. 20: p. 8] Both the king and the shah have made concessions to the center in order to raise standards of living, to satisfy short-term security requirements or in the interests of development. On the other hand, both have demonstrated a determination to resist the West when conditions enabled them to chart an independent course based on their own, not the center's socio-economic values. It has been a common error of center nations to confuse a temporary confluence of interests, or a tactical assumption of the center's methods with voluntary assimilation of its values [Ref. 17: p. 127]. As will be more fully discussed later, it is possible that Morocco's "colonial" experience made it more sensitive to the ultimate impossibility of assimilation than was Iran.

2. Impact on Legitimization

Both the psychological and real results of structural dependence complicate the problems associated with the king's dilemma. Albert Memmi views cultural nationalism, as manifested by pan-Arabism, pan-Islamicism and the movement toward Arabicization, as a reaction to the negative myths

thrust upon the people of the Middle East by the dominant powers. He notes that it has become de riguer in the Arab world to assert differences with the West with a vengeance, whether linguistic, cultural or religious. Unfortunately, this has meant that colonialism's negative myths, relating to the inferiority of Eastern culture, have merely been replaced by equally inaccurate positive myths, as expressed in the dogma of popular cultural nationalism. [Ref. 17: pp. 132-9]

Cultural nationalism, an expression of the periphery's latent desire for independence, poses several problems for modernizing rulers. To begin with, it often encourages efforts in areas that are somewhat counter-productive. Witness the difficulties caused by "Arabicization" of the educational system. Arabic equivalents for most modern technical terms did not exist and had to be invented. Graduates of this system were so limited by their Arabic education that unless they possessed fluency in a European language, higher education was precluded.

Cultural nationalism also encourages forces that impede the modernizing process (i.e., pan-Arabism, pan-Islamicism). As already discussed, a key to the modernizing process is the exchange of traditional commitments for the values and aspirations of the modern world. The pan-Arabic and pan-Islamic movements seek to reverse that trend. Most serious, however, is the threat cultural nationalism poses to modernizing rulers themselves.

Cultural nationalism strives to overcome or at least explain the economic and cultural weakness which persists in Islamic states when evaluated against Western standards. One common reaction has been to find foreign scapegoats to explain the Arab world's inability to solve its own problems (i.e., America as the "great Satan"). For these reasons, the appearance of independence is among the most important public policy goals for the rulers of developing countries. [Ref. 21: p. 41]

Reforming leaders in the Third World cannot afford to become too closely identified with the center even though they are absolutely dependent on its assistance for development. It is essential that they maintain the apparent capability to make their own decisions, free of foreign interference. Nehru alluded to the liabilities of alignment when he declared at Bandung in 1956: "If I join any of these big groups, I lose my identity: I have no identity left, I have no views left." [Ref. 21: p. 42] The links between the ruler, the nation's identity and the perceived ability to take independent action, therefore, are essential elements of the ruler's legitimacy.

Both King Hassan and the shah looked to history as a source of legitimacy by attempting to tie their regimes to past glories, real or imagined. They attempted, with differing degrees of success, to link a primordial national heritage with goals of political modernity. Yet, the

contradictory forces arising from the imperialist experience and dependency have complicated and impeded this task.

On one hand, Western-influenced Arab reformers tend to deplore the excesses of autocratic, monarchical rule (the king's dilemma). On the other hand, they blame the failure of Western parliamentary forms on their vulnerability to manipulation by external powers. [Ref. 9: pp. 123-5] This leaves rulers in the impossible position of trying to achieve mutually exclusive objectives i.e., promoting the agenda suggested by cultural nationalism while both satisfying national development needs and trying to placate the center nations [Ref. 20: p. 8].

Heavy-handed Western diplomacy has often aggravated the legitimacy problems facing modernizing rulers. Egyptian public opinion following the assassination of Anwar Sadat illustrates the deadly stigma associated with the perception by the public of close identification with the West. As a U.S. observer in Cairo reported:

Most important, intense popular feelings have been directed against the Egyptian president who took in America's Shah; who offered military facilities to the U.S.; who did not protest American shelving of the West Bank/Palestinian issue;...Sadat seemed, to most Egyptians, almost pathetically eager to proclaim his loyalty to his U.S. ally...most Egyptians also felt that Sadat had compromised Egypt's independence; that he had made Egypt a toady of the United States. [Ref. 22: pp. 18-9]

The case of the shah is another relevant example. The perception, held by the Iranian people, that the shah was an American hireling clearly undercut his legitimacy. However in a region of the world where many Islamic fundamentalists increasingly oppose anything that smacks of moderation let alone Western penetration, even far less extreme forms of cooperation with center nations encourage domestic and international opposition. To growing numbers of the radicalized intelligentsia, political modernity has nothing to do with transforming the nation, it simply camouflages the activities of the neo-colonialists and promotes a class of local bourgeoisie that act as the West's business agents. [Ref. 16: pp. 152-3]

The difficulties which confronted the Shah of Iran and now confront King Hassan illustrate the link between modernization and dependency. In both countries, modern values and goods clearly raised expectations among previously quiescent segments of society. Both rulers exploited this public mood to rally popular support for further reform. Rising expectations, however, can be a two-edged sword. If left unfulfilled, they breed frustration and ultimately contribute to regime threatening instability.

Since neither Iran nor Morocco can meet the modern needs of their populations without external assistance, continued progress toward modernity is related to maintenance of center-periphery relationships. Unfortunately for

reforming rulers, the perception of dependence on external powers undercuts an important source of legitimacy--their "independence." In this way, dependence aggravates the already serious problems the "king's dilemma" presents for modernizing rulers.

King Hassan faces many of the problems related to modernization and dependency which combined to defeat the shah. In the next chapter, we will explore the changing environment, characterized by conflicting societal perceptions and increasing evidence of civil unrest, in which the Shah of Iran tried to modernize a traditional Islamic society. [A key element in the shah's fall was his failure to find the proper balance between his critical need for external assistance and the adverse consequences of accepting it. The shah's failure in Iran will serve as the baseline by which we can evaluate Hassan's progress toward modernizing Morocco. The intention is not to merely show that Morocco is not Iran. To accurately assess King Hassan's prospects, this thesis must answer the question of whether King Hassan's policies reflect an understanding of the shah's mistakes.]

III. THE SHAH

Until 1978, the Shah of Iran had been regarded as one of the world's richest and most powerful monarchs. His goal was to transform Iran into a progressive, modern, industrialized nation before its oil resources were depleted [Ref. 23: p.4]. He appeared resolute in his determination to achieve that goal, speaking of a future in which Iran would become the "fifth industrial nation of the world [Ref. 24: p. 98]. There seemed no limit to the shah's grandiose plans, yet as the events of 1978 would prove, many of the shah's dreams were fantasies.

The shah, never truly aware of the magnitude or strength of his opposition, was astonished by the riots, demonstrations and strikes which beset his rule from the summer of 1978 onward. By the end of the year, his power base had almost vanished. When he perceived that even the United States would no longer support him, he felt he had no choice but to leave his country for a "temporary vacation" abroad. This time there would be no CIA counter-coup to bring the shah back to power.

Zbigniew Brzezinski, President Carter's National Security Advisor, admits the Carter administration consistently sent contradictory signals to the shah that actually exacerbated his decline. It was, he says, an "intellectual

misjudgment of a central historical reality", a failure to understand

that rapid modernization of a very traditional society breeds its own instabilities and revolutionary dynamics, that it requires a political system that can gradually enlarge political participation while providing safety valves for social dissatisfaction, that old religious beliefs should not be uprooted without gradual public acceptance of more modern values, including some genuine connection with the past. [Ref. 25: p. 397]

Brzezinski also assigns importance to such idiosyncratic factors as the shah's illness, his tendency toward indecision, and the impact of American policy on a basically weak personality. He concludes that once it became clear that the shah lacked the personal will and toughness to assert his power, U.S. policy became virtually irrelevant. [Ref. 25: pp. 395-7]

One who writes from an entirely different political perspective, Fereydoun Hoveyda, also agrees that in the end the shah was really the architect of his own defeat.⁴ [Ref. 26: p. 85] Although Hoveyda, Brzezinski and other observers of the Iranian Revolution would assign different priorities to the variables which led to the shah's downfall, everyone's list seems to include factors which fit the

⁴Hoveyda is the brother of Amir Abass Hoveyda, the Iranian Prime Minister from 1965-76. He was imprisoned toward the end of the shah's reign and executed by the fundamentalists after his fall. Hoveyda harbors a bitter, though understandable, hatred for the shah, blaming him for his brother's murder.

following categories:

1. Domestic factors (power base, social mobilization, political participation)
2. Role of Islam
3. Leadership factors
4. Economic development
5. Foreign penetration

Within these categories one discovers a textbook example of the confrontation between modern and traditional forces. The shah, by his manipulation of social, political and economic processes, unleashed forces opposed to those his throne required to maintain its centrality in politics. The result stands as a classic example of the destructive potential of the "king's dilemma." These forces had their most immediate impact on a factor absolutely critical to the crown's legitimacy: the sources of its domestic support

A. DOMESTIC FACTORS

1. Power Base

Monarchs normally build their constituency on the traditional power holders: landed aristocracy, the merchant elite, the clerical establishment and local notables [Ref. 9: p. 26]. In addition, the modernizing monarch can draw support from the state bureaucracy, the middle class, the masses and even foreign governments [Ref. 8: p. 28]. The loyalty of these sources of power to the shah's throne was in doubt from the very start of the young king's reign.

Intense foreign interference and the humiliating circumstances of his father's abdication increased nationalist opposition to his rule. In addition, the shah lacked such basic rationalizations as charisma and religion to lend legitimacy to his crown. It was only after the deposition of Prime Minister Mossadegh in 1953 that the shah even began to rule his realm. Prior to his CIA-assisted return to the throne, his role had been merely to reign. After 1953, the shah was forced to quickly master the art of divide and rule in order to control his opposition. [Ref. 27: p. 199]

Over the next decade, the shah took steps to affirm his authority over every aspect of the Iranian government by declaring martial law and completely overriding the Iranian Majlis. By 1963, with the country firmly under his control, the shah introduced his program of reform and development known as the "White Revolution." The revolution seemed to have the nation's support as open incidents of opposition became less frequent.

In 1967, 26 years after his accession to the throne, the shah's royal legitimacy was formally proclaimed at a grandiose coronation ceremony rumored to have cost the country millions and attended by an impressive collection of dignitaries. This "historic " event was in tune with the spectacular rate of economic and social development that Iran enjoyed from 1963 to 1973. Yet during this decade of

relentless modernization, growing inequalities between Iran's classes were adding to the reservoir of traditional resentment quietly held by many toward the shah's policies. [Ref. 28: pp. 62-6]

The giant increase in oil revenues in 1973 increased the disparities between the various segments of Iranian society. With the advantage of hindsight, it is now clear that from 1973 onward the shah's power base began to crumble. By the autumn of 1978, the shah's base had narrowed to portions of the state bureaucracy (primarily the military) and a rapidly dwindling number of notables. The coalition of groups united in their determination to destroy the shah and the trappings of the monarchy cut across the rest of Iranian society: Shiite religious leaders, tribal minorities, bureaucrats, bazaar merchants, students, professionals, intellectuals, communists, liberals, laborers, peasants, sophisticated urbanites, and conservative agrarians [Ref. 29: p. 166-7].

One group that was ready to exploit the growing dissatisfaction with the shah's policies was the clergy. From the beginning, they had resented the Pahlavis' attempts to glorify the monarchy. From their perspective, the Pahlavi-inspired monarchical ideology-mythology devalued Islam. For example, the shah's attempt at his coronation to impose the Persian calendar, dating from Cyrus the Great rather than from the Prophet's "hejira", seemed an attempt

by the monarchy to supersede Iran's Islamic traditions.
[Ref. 30: p. 241]

The ulama's hatred for the shah also stemmed from a number of concrete grievances. They bitterly resented the shah's modernization program, because it deprived them of their old religious estates, as well as the fact that the shah's civil rights reforms removed their power over the judiciary. In addition, the regime had unsuccessfully to cut government subsidies to the ulama in the mid 1970s.

By 1976, Islamic fundamentalism, manifested in the form of large scale demonstrations, was openly challenging the existing order. Because of the Shia clergy's relative financial independence from the state, the shah had little leverage over their activities. [Ref. 24: p. 84] His uncertain application of repressive measures, followed by attempts at appeasement, seemed only to increase the mullahs' contempt for his regime.

The shah's reforms also threatened traditional business interests in the bazaar. Despite the modernization of the economy, the bazaar still accounted for 30 percent of all imports and two-thirds of domestic trade. With bazaari access to foreign exchange, through carpets, nuts and dried fruits, their lending power accounted for 15 percent of private sector [Ref. 30: pp. 245-6]

The new Western banking system superseded the lending monopolies the bazaris had long profited from. The

traditional system had allowed them to provide money at relatively usurious rates. In addition, the shah's plans provided for new commercial and shopping districts that would result in parts of the bazaar being torn down. This was part of a government plan to reduce bazaari power by building new streets, shops, schools and institutions, making it easier to control distribution and cut down on "profiteering." The traditional merchant class was also offended by the general secularization of Iranian society. Thus, for a combination of religious and material reasons, this group, once part of the shah's natural constituency, also began to openly oppose his rule. [Ref. 30: pp. 245-6]

Most foreign observers agreed that the military was the one group likely to remain a potent force in support of the shah's regime until the bitter end. By the autumn of 1978, conditions in Iran had so deteriorated that the regime's only hope of survival seemed to lie with the army. However, the decisive military action which might have saved the shah was not forthcoming. The growing revolution revealed some serious shortcomings in the professional military which had been less apparent when the shah's powers were at their peak.

As a result of the shah's success in centralizing all power in the palace, his army lacked the unified command structure required for independent action. The shah had little confidence in his generals and lacked tough military

advisors willing to tell him it was "time to pull the trigger." [Ref. 31: p. 85] When the shah finally appointed a military government in November of 1978, its relative moderation extended the general perception of the ruling elites' weakness to the military. The shah, for reasons which will be discussed later, was unwilling to give his generals permission to employ an "iron fist" strategy against the growing crowds of dissidents. His generals, having built careers based on close cooperation with and support from the United States, were convinced that even if the shah failed to command it, America would eventually ask them to act. American signals, as we know, were hopelessly confused.

In the meantime, the religious leaders continued to infiltrate and coopt the lower levels of the shah's army, particularly the soldiers who had been in the streets facing the chanting crowds and listening to the sermons of the mullahs. By the end of the year, the military's potential to head off the revolution had disappeared. [Ref. 32: pp. 23-30] Khomeini had succeeded in separating the men from the officers, effectively disarming the shah's army before a battle could take place [Ref. 24: p. 146].

2. Social Mobilization

The process of chipping away at the basis for the shah's support had begun with the "White Revolution" in

1963.⁵ Paradoxically, the shah initiated this program of reforms at Washington's behest because of the Kennedy Administration's concern for the narrowness of his power base. They were an attempt to build popular support in a deteriorating political situation. To the shah, the success of the revolution seemed assured by the overwhelming support given to his six point referendum, held in January 1963. In fact, the reforms marked the end of Western-style parliamentary monarchy in Iran and the beginning of absolute monarchy. [Ref. 12: p. 71]

Although the land reform provisions of the "White Revolution" assured Washington of the shah's commitment to "equity and social justice", they cost the shah the support of the traditional landlords and alienated portions of the clergy which held large religious estates. [Ref. 23: p. 77] On the other hand, the shah succeeded in separating the landlords from the 70 percent of the Iranian population they had previously controlled. The land reforms thus added a new peasant-based potential source of support for the shah's regime. [Ref. 23: p. 85].

⁵The six points embodied in the "White Revolution" were: (i) abolition of the landlord-serf relationship; (ii) nationalization of the forests; (iii) amendment of the election laws, including the enfranchisement of women; (iv) sale of government factories to pay for land reform; (v) approval of workers sharing company profits; (vi) establishment of a literacy corps to facilitate compulsory education.

However, other effects of the "White Revolution" negated the benefits flowing from this new base of rural support. Many of the peasants who had been excluded from the redistribution process chose to become urban rather than rural workers. In addition, many of the redistributed parcels of land were too small to be farmed efficiently. The government had neither the bureaucratic machinery nor the agricultural expertise necessary to replace the large landowners. Nor was it willing to commit the financial resources necessary to facilitate such a transition. Thus, the owners of the small plots often sold them off to larger owners and moved to the cities as well. Finally, the children of the remaining prosperous farmers preferred the excitement of urban life to the drab rural existence. [Ref. 5: p. 56]

As a result of these various factors, total agricultural production gradually fell in the years following the "White Revolution." Iran went from virtual agricultural self-sufficiency in the late 1960s to a position as one of the world's largest food importers, with nearly \$2 billion in agricultural imports, by 1976 [Ref. 5: p. 219]. Of course, changing tastes brought about by prosperity was another important factor explaining the increased demand for imported food products. Nonetheless, an unwanted result of the land reform process was that decreased local agricultural productivity added to the rural exodus to the cities.

The long-term political consequence of land reforms, therefore, was an increasingly volatile situation in the cities, in which the bonds between the masses and the crown were finally broken.

Due to the massive demographic flow from the hinterlands, the urban population had quadrupled between 1956 and the end of the 1970s. Urban services had grown accordingly, but were becoming less effective due to an increasingly bloated bureaucracy. Eventually, city administrations were unable to provide even the most fundamental level of sanitary or civil services for the exploding urban masses. Unemployment, underemployment, inflation and the highly visible spending habits of Iran's "nouveau riche" elites heightened the antipathy the majority of the urban classes felt for the government bureaucracy. [Ref. 32: p. 9] Only partially modernized, the residual traditional values of the urban masses made the cities fertile ground for the seeds of religious passion sown by the mullahs.

One of the documents found after the revolution was a memorandum, presumed to have been written by the CIA, recommending a set of guidelines for the shah to pursue after his return to power in 1953. The document suggested that the shah attempt to expand the middle class. A large middle class, with a more secular outlook, would be less susceptible to the old traditional appeals and form a natural foundation for his regime. [Ref. 24: p. 67]

The shah followed this blueprint carefully. His modernization programs provided for the education of tens of thousands of Iranians abroad. Yet this effort failed to add substantially to his regime's support. Between 1950 and 1968, a total of 325,731 students were sent to other countries; only 22,681 of them returned to Iran [Ref. 11: p. 150]. Of those who did return, most were thoroughly inculcated with Western ideals and methods. Once in Iran, however, many found they were forced to accept positions below their expectations.

3. Political Participation

To provide a political outlet for their frustrations, the shah created the "Rastakhiz" (Renaissance) Party in 1975. Once it became apparent that this step toward democratization would lead to challenges to the shah's power, he imposed severe limitations on the party's ability to take independent political action. [Ref. 32: pp.9-10] In the shah's view these measures were required to compensate for the basic weakness of oriental society. He believed the people were weak and could only be guided by a firm, exacting hand. [Ref. 24: p. 70]

It is true that the peasantry, whose recent migration accounted for most of the urban working class, was politically immature. The shah was able to keep the discontent of Iran's more sophisticated citizens at a low simmer

by the association of his regime with the undeniable material benefits of Iran's initial economic progress.

However, eventually the absence of political safety valves combined with the economic slowdown to boil over in more serious and visible forms of dissatisfaction. [Ref. 11: p. 144-5] The shah's political system remained unchanged although the rest of Iranian society had been transformed. The nation had evolved into a multi-cultured society, but the shah was unwilling to let the people modify the old unitary set of rules.⁶ This inflexibility alienated growing numbers of students, intellectuals and members of the middle class who had initially embraced modernization with enthusiasm.

B. THE ROLE OF ISLAM

1. Legitimizing Influence

The shah's attempts to use religion as a legitimizing device were largely unsuccessful. He was forced to compete with the mujtahid who in Shia Islam represent the "hidden Imam." Lacking a traditional, doctrinal link with the almighty, the shah attempted to emphasize his special relationship with divinity, occasionally referring to

⁶Dr. A. Afghani, in a lecture presented at the Naval Postgraduate School, 28 November 1984. Dr. Afghani was a member of the faculty of the National University in Tehran during the period in question.

himself as the "shadow of God." He often stated that he felt "there was some supreme being who is guiding me" and credited his numerous personal escapes from assassination and political disasters to "some unseen hand." [Ref. 27: p. 209]

By the onset of the revolution, Iranians apparently saw little evidence of God's hand in the repression and injustices of the shah's regime. Some of the slogans shouted by the diverse groups united under the banner of Islam were: "Down with the shah and his oppressive regime"; and "Long live Khomeini, democracy, freedom and equality." [Ref. 23: p. 194] To the shah, such slogans confirmed his conviction that his opposition was an "unholy alliance of red and black", a destructive union of anti-West communists and religious zealots [Ref. 1: p. 162].

In fact, the slogans indicate how effectively the clergy was able to coopt democratic ideals as well as entice moderate segments of Iranian society to join in opposition that in the end served primarily the clergy's interests. As previously discussed, opposition to the shah was not limited to the "red and black" but cut across Iranian society and included elites and liberals as well as leftists and bazaaris. The clergy, however, was the crucial element, serving both as facilitator through the mosques, and as the glue that held the diverse groups together.

2. Opposition to the Shah

The clergy's reasons for its total opposition to the shah went beyond the loss of land, revenues and judicial power which resulted from the White Revolution. Its opposition stemmed from the process of modernization itself. Modernization threatened the very basis for the ulama's existence by its challenge to the fundamental prescriptions of the Quran. [Ref. 33: p. 183] Khomeni's medieval views of the corrupting influence of modern civilization, secular values and Western civilization were apparent in his address to the faithful on the last day of Ramadan in 1980.

When democrats talk about freedom, they are inspired by the superpowers. They want to lead our youth to places of corruption....If that is what they want, than yes, we are reactionaries. You who want prostitution and freedom want to have freedom to have bars, brothels, and opium. But we want our youth to carve out a new period in history. We do not want intellectuals. [Ref. 34: p. 82]

One explanation for the mullahs' dominant role in the revolution was simply that no other major independent institution had survived the shah's attempts to centralize all authority in the crown. Since the shah and Savak had suppressed all meaningful political activity, only Islam remained as a viable alternative to the regime. This explanation accurately describes the mosques' important organizational function as a channel for the peoples' discontent but does not fully explain the role of Islam. It fails to

adequately emphasize the fact that much of the basis for that discontent was the depth of the average Iranian's attachment to Islam and his responsiveness to appeals couched in Islamic terms. [Ref. 35: p. 189] The mullahs provided the disparate groups with a common ideology and provided the infrastructure needed to coordinate the protests for maximum impact. [Ref. 36: pp. 98-9]

Shiism was a particularly effective vehicle for revolution in the Iranian context because of its oppositional nature, its stress on self-sacrifice, and the concept of sanctuary ("bast" or inviolability of the mosque). Even more important was the basic tenet that no temporal authority may be conceded prior to the reappearance of the "Mahdi" (Hidden Imam). [Ref. 36: p. 101] This left the Shiite ulama, who derive their legitimacy from the "Mahdi", relatively independent of temporal rule. In the absence of the Hidden Imam, Shiite jurisprudence calls for the ulama to perform his function. Thus, apart from the Sharia itself, the consensus of the ulama is the best guide which mortals can follow. This argument obviously gave the Shiite ulama a superior tactical position from which to launch a revolution. [Ref. 37: p. 34]

The odd coalition of liberal elites, dissatisfied bourgeoisie, leftists and bazaaris thought the mullahs would recede from political life once the shah was removed. The secular groups never understood the degree to which the

mullahs facilitated the revolution. Although foreign observers were certain the revolution's strength came from the elites and the liberal middle class, the mullahs easily overpowered their secular supporters once the revolution was established.

The core of the revolution's strength was actually the link between the urban masses and the religious element. Paradoxically, modern conditions in the form of urbanization and ease of communication had helped the mullahs to organize a revolt without the support of the hard-to-mobilize rural masses. The rioting crowds of new urban immigrants saw the shah in Islamic terms as "Yazid, murderer of Hussein." [Ref. 38: p. 43.] In the chaotic aftermath of the revolution, the secular groups learned to their dismay that they had needed Khomeini far more than he needed them.

C. LEADERSHIP FACTORS

1. Will and Personality

As events indicated, the shah no longer had the will to apply power as ruthlessly as would have been necessary to reverse the direction or momentum of events in 1978. As early as 1947, U.S. Ambassador George Allen had noted the shah's tendency to resist using his dictatorial powers to control domestic unrest [Ref. 2: p. 11]. More recently, Ambassador Sullivan had observed that the shah did not seem

to be the type of "hard-nosed" individual well cast to lead in time of crisis [Ref. 39: p. 11]. It could be argued that "hard-nosed" measures would have clashed with the shah's natural inclination toward liberalization. He seemed to want nothing so much as to gradually withdraw and someday abdicate in favor of his son. In his own words:

A sovereign may not save his throne by shedding his countrymen's blood. A dictator can, for he acts in the name of ideology and believes it must triumph no matter what the cost. But a sovereign is not a dictator. He can not break the alliance that exists between him and his people. A dictator has nothing to bestow for power resides in him alone. A sovereign is given a crown and must bequeath it to the next generation. [Ref. 1: p. 167]

Unfortunately, the timing of the liberalization that was forced upon him was wrong. Given the characteristic Iranian suspicion of acts of accommodation, every reform was seen as a concession made under pressure. Such little "surrenders" earned for the shah only increased contempt. In Iran's culture, opposition elements typically assess amicable treatment as an indication of weakness [Ref. 11: p. 118].

Increasingly, the shah withdrew from reality, protected by a bodyguard of syncophants and seemingly paralysed by indecision. [Ref. 36: p. 95] If no one ever dared lie to Reza Shah, now just the opposite was true. No one dared tell his son the truth. Flattery had become one of the tools of survival in Iran. With the possible exception

of North Korea's Kim il Sung, no world leader encouraged flattery to the extent as did the Shah of Iran. In a manner consistent with the Shiite concept of "taquiya", Iranians chose to "tell Caesar what he wanted to hear", rather than render to him what was his. [Ref. 38: p. 2].

During the year preceding the revolution, there was one terrifying piece of the truth, known only by the shah, which in retrospect partly explains his seeming listlessness and fatalistic attitude during the critical summer and autumn months of 1978. French doctors, who examined the shah early in 1978, informed him that he was terminally ill with cancer and that the disease would gradually impair his reactions and decision-making ability. Although the shah eventually shared the burden of this knowledge with his wife, it was never known by the United States government or the shah's opposition. The hidden effects of the shah's fatal disease made his failure to act that much more incomprehensible to both his allies and his foes. [Ref. 11: p. 204]

Treasury Secretary Blumenthal, who met with the shah in November 1978, was shocked by the shah's apparent depression. He reported to Ambassador Sullivan that he "saw no prospect that a man in such a mood could attain the resolve to take political or other forceful actions necessary to preserve his authority." [Ref. 39: p. 196] Prime Minister Azhari told Sullivan that he did not think he could carry on

any longer because of the shah's indecision and unwillingness to use force [Ref. 24: p. 161]. U.S. policies were not helpful in this respect. The Carter Administration continued to send mixed signals up to the day the shah finally left the country. At any rate, the shah's paralysis of will and vacillation in time of crisis, whether due to a basic character flaw, or induced by his private knowledge of the seriousness of his illness, had a tragic impact on the final outcome.

2. Cultural Schizophrenia

The shah's growing material dependence on the U.S. was probably not nearly as significant as his growing psychological dependence. His dependence was of the ambivalent nature discussed in Chapter II. As a youth, the shah was educated with the sons of wealthy Europeans and other top Iranian officials at the exclusive Le Posey school in Switzerland. While his European education rid him of Reza Shah's provincialism and created within him an admiration for Western culture, technology and institutions, it also created a chauvinistic attachment to the values and traditions of Iran.

"Cultural schizophrenia", stemming from these early experiences, might best describe the differences between the shah's style of leadership and that which marked the reign of his father. In a strange way, the shah tried to make

Iran's traditional conventions conform to the criteria of Western liberalism. For example, on a number of public occasions, he tried to justify authoritarian measures or explain the necessity of the monarchy to his people--signs of personal insecurity never exhibited by Reza Shah or any other Iranian monarch. [Ref. 12: p. 58-9]

In the months immediately prior to the revolution, the shah's use of the "Western yardstick" placed impossible constraints on his ability to salvage the rapidly deteriorating situation. Brzezinski was perhaps the first member of the Carter Administration to understand the implications of the shah's need for constant reassurance from the U.S. He warned against policies which might be perceived by the shah as signalling the end of American support for his regime. [Ref. 25: p. 377]

Brzezinski was convinced the administration's constant human rights refrain not only embarrassed the shah, but weakened him by relentlessly pressing him to make concessions to his opponents. Brzezinski advocated taking a hard line. He promoted the theories of historian Crane Brinton, who had observed that successful revolutions were rarities. Determined leadership, through a timely combination of repression and concession invariably was able to disarm its opposition. [Ref. 25: p. 355]

This was the prescription successfully adhered to by the shah following Mossadegh's fall and in the upheaval over

the White Revolution. On both of these occasions, the shah had cracked down hard, convincing the uncommitted of the hopelessness of dissent. This time the shah hesitated to use his coercive powers. Those in the middle sensed the hopelessness of the shah's position and cast their lot with the revolution. [Ref. 11: p. 205]

D. ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

Future shock was considered virtuous, the goal of rational modernization to be pressed forward ruthlessly by means of science, technology, planning and despotic authority. No element of tradition, no personal desire, no aesthetic value, no religious qualm, no philosophic hesitancy was to stand in the way....the extent of the opposition to the shah was not primarily because of his repressive treatment of the opposition, but because of the outrageous simplemindedness of his modernization programs which attacked the quiescent and made political activists of them. [Ref. 5: p. 58]

1. Years of Boom

The accuracy of the preceding comments by Leonard Binder demonstrates the advantages of hindsight. At the time however, the shah's program of rapid economic development was almost universally hailed. His economic achievements in the 1960s and 1970s were particularly impressive. Per capita income had increased from \$300 to \$2200. More than 65 percent of the population owned the houses they lived in. Literacy had improved from only 15 to 50 percent. Primary school attendance was up from 270,000 to over 10 million.

It should, however, be noted that the most significant progress was made before 1973. After that date, problems arising from the shah's belief in quick easy development began to surface. The quantum leap in oil revenues, rather than spurring even greater development, led to grandiose schemes and excesses that finally brought Iran's development to a halt. Symptomatic indications that Iran's economy was headed for a final crash were: overconcentration of power and wealth, luxury centered consumption, pervasive corruption, excessive military expenditures, rising food imports and a general lack of sound analysis by the shah's advisors. [Ref. 11: p. 145]

The abundance of oil-generated money encouraged the shah to begin a spending spree that exceeded the Iranian economy's "absorptive capability [Ref. 5: p. 121]. The executives of 25 major firms doing business in Iran bluntly informed American Ambassador William Sullivan that

Iran's chances of shifting to a broad-based economy were small, that part of the problem was the shah's insistence on acquiring the latest in 'gold plated technology, both military and industrial equipment', that he was neglecting his agricultural center, and that the shah was an megalomaniac. [Ref. 31: p. 81]

Sullivan himself harbored doubts about the ability of Iranian labor to respond to the shah's massive program of industrialization [Ref. 39: pp. 30-1]. In his previous assignment as Ambassador to the Philippines, he had become

sensitized to the impact of capital-labor disparities (although in the Philippines the mismatch was reversed).

2. The Economic Crash

Inflation, in the wake of and as a direct result of the shah's spree, averaged 30 to 50 percent. The unprecedented expansion of government expenditures increased liquidity and effective demand. Yet, as Ambassador Sullivan noted, Iranian infrastructure was inadequate to absorb resources at an acceptable rate of return. The supply of domestic goods simply could not increase at the same rate as demand, especially in the construction and housing industries. [Ref. 5: p. 222-43] The unfortunate fact was that most of the cities' newer inhabitants could not adjust their personal incomes to keep up with rising prices.

Rentals were uncontrolled and by 1975 accounted for 30 to 60 percent of most urban workers' wages. The resultant pressure on wages explains the 35 to 45 percent increase in wages over the same period. By 1976, land prices in urban areas had risen by 78 percent. [Ref. 5: p. 214-5] A new class of "nouveau riche" appeared, ready to cash in on this 20th century "gold rush." [Ref. 40: p. 224] Even though almost every Iranian was better off than 20 years before, the gap between rich and poor had widened and became the focus of economic discontent. The conspicuous consumption of the new money class created resentment among the urban masses and the bazaaris.

Corruption also touched the shah, if not directly, then at least through his family. They seemed to treat Iran as if it were their private property, routinely engaging in the most outrageous excesses. By way of illustration, in 1976 the U.S. Treasury reported the decline of Iran's investible surplus from \$10.7 billion in 1974 to \$4.5 billion in 1976. On the very day that report was published, Empress Farah was returning from Paris, having just purchased three tons of rose marble for the royal family's new swimming pool. [Ref. 11: p. 156] By 1979, the royal family and the Pahlavi foundation controlled 80 percent of the cement industry in Iran, 70 percent of the hotels and tourism, 62 percent of banking and insurance, 40 percent of the textile industry and 35 percent of the motor industry. [Ref. 24: p. 95]

The shah's attempts to crack down on corruption just made matters worse by undermining his relationships with various segments of his political base. Most public officials resisted suggestions to slow down the pace of Iran's development, not wanting to forego the opportunities for personal enrichment it presented. The shah's anti-profiteering campaign failed to touch these sources of high level corruption or those who controlled the country's oil wealth. The anti-profiteering campaign merely resulted in the arrest of 7,500 merchants and the fining of 10,000 more, clearly alienating the bazaaris and cementing their alliance

with the mullahs against the shah. [Ref. 11: p. 156]
Although the shah considered himself above corruption, Iranian citizens perceived a clear connection between the shah and the corruption that riddled his regime.

Khomeini was able to depict the shah as the personification of corruption. He exploited the seeds of distrust and resentment government policies had sowed among the bazaaris and other strata of Iranian society. His brand of Shiism, with its emphasis on social justice, took full advantage of the people's growing distaste for the injustice inherent in the shah's regime. The sudden great wealth that had once encouraged the shah to aspire to be the world's "fifth industrial nation" also created the inequalities and alarm that led to revolution. [Ref. 34: p. 401]

E. FOREIGN DEPENDENCE

1. Myth of Independence

Iran's traditional monarchy, which could claim 2500 years of continuous existence, seemed to have a headstart toward modernization in the post-war era. Its well established institutions of national authority, when compared to those of other developing countries, gave it a clear advantage in the face of the challenges presented by rapid social, political and economic change. By virtue of having avoided status as a colony of an imperial power, Iran was

able to perpetuate the myth of Iranian independence. As previously discussed, Iran's freedom from direct colonial administration was primarily due to the circumstances of Anglo-Russian imperial competition which allowed the indigenous monarchy to retain its independence. [Ref. 8: p. 152-3] Nonetheless, Iranians belief in their country's "unique" ability to avoid control by foreign powers contributed to a sense of national pride, certainly a key element in the shah's early successes at "nation-building." [Ref. 41: p. 203]

Iran's myth of independence, however, had some unfortunate impacts on its development and on its people. In the first place, Iran did not have colonial models of bureaucracy and administration to rely on during its development process. Even more significantly, Iran never experienced the unifying benefits that the struggle for independence against a palpable enemy provided many other nations, including Morocco. With the tangible symbols of the enemy's direct control absent, Iranians could tend to reach cynical conclusions about the origins of the obvious influence held by various foreign powers over domestic events in Iran. [Ref. 41: p. 204-5]

2. Xenophobia

This led to the Iranian "ab zire kah" conception of politics. Everyone and everything was assumed to have a

price. All members of the political elite were seen as corrupt and more loyal to foreign powers than to their own country. Even during the shah's heyday there was a tendency to classify Iranian politicians as pro-German, pro-Russian, pro-French, pro-American, etc. The system of indirect colonialism further fed Iranians' naturally strong xenophobic tendencies. Since the system made it very difficult to determine who was responsible for anything in Iran, Iranians found it too easy to simply blame foreigners for everything. This feature of Iran's "colonial legacy", which was still operating on the political scene in the pre-revolutionary Iran of the 1970s, further compounded the "king's dilemma" for the shah. [Ref. 41: p. 205]

Xenophobia is a strong political weapon that the shah, due to his close identification with foreign powers, sought to avoid. Mossadegh used it with success during the nationalization period of the early 1950s. Khomeini, as we have recently observed, wielded it with great effect to inflame anti-American passions against the shah in 1978. America's transformation in Iranian eyes from savior to satan can best be understood in the context of Iranian history which in turn partially explains the nation's strange and paranoic character. [Ref. 30: p. 276]

3. The American Connection

One obvious symbol of the changes wrought by the shah on Iranian society was the physical presence of a large foreign community. The Americans, by far the most visible of the foreign groups, numbered 45,000 in Tehran alone by 1979 [Ref. 2: pp. 31-3]. The extent of the foreign presence stoked the traditional xenophobia of many Iranians. The shah, who had needed American help to wrest power from Mossadegh in 1953, never broke away from the associations formed by his regime's initial dependence on foreign intervention. In the eyes of his people, he was closely identified with the United States and was even suspected by many of being an American "agent." [Ref. 23: p. 204]

Even Iran's economic power, following the 1973 Middle East War, was not enough to bring symmetry to U.S.-Iranian relations. Oil revenues transformed the country into a capital surplus, skilled labor deficient, unskilled labor abundant country. The shah squandered the economic largess on an unrealistic, over-ambitious course of militarization and industrialization that greatly exceeded the country's non-capital resources. [Ref. 5: p. 122] This made him even more dependent on the United States for the high-tech equipment, the expertise and the trained personnel needed to implement his programs. [Ref. 23: pp. 205-5]

Further dependence led to increased tensions between Iran and the United States. The 1964 extraterritoriality agreement, which applied to American workers in Iran, was also offensive to many Iranians. They saw the special legal status of American workers as demeaning to both Islamic and Iranian jurisprudence. In addition, Iranians resisted American suggestions that they slow the pace of their development. They felt simultaneously cheated and insulted when they could not operate the new technology without American assistance. [Ref. 11: p. 136]

Under the Nixon Doctrine, the shah became one of the "twin pillars" in America's strategy for the stability of the Persian Gulf. The United States supported the shah's economic policies, and until 1977, met every arms sales request without delay. Although the nature of the regime's dependence of the United States had changed; it was now dependent on U.S. support for the success of its programs, not regime survival; the degree of dependence was greater than ever.

For many Iranians, the growing American influence in administration, economy, the armed forces and social services reinforced the idea that the shah was an American puppet. They believed he had sold out their country and that Iranian resources were being exploited for the benefit of foreigners. It seemed that Iranian cultural identity, beliefs and values were being sacrificed in the name of the

shah's extravagant visions for their future. V. S. Naipul has collected and condensed the Iranian "man on the street view" as follows:

When the shah ruled, everything in Iran had been for him. He had drained the country of billions; he had allowed the country to be plundered by foreign companies; he had filled the country with foreign advisors and technicians. These foreigners got huge salaries and lived in big houses; the Americans even had their own television service. The people of Iran felt they had lost their country. And the shah never really cared for religion, the precious Shia faith. [Ref. 34: p. 28]

The American involvement was so visible and so pervasive that it was easy to associate it with the regime's abuses. The degree of American support for some of the shah's over-ambitious plans now appears to have been in neither country's interests. In the final analysis, however, it was the shah, not America, who was responsible for failure of his own policies. Even in the final months of his reign, American policy makers failed to understand the extent of the shah's decision-making constraints. U.S. officials were telling the shah, quite appropriately, that he had America's support, but that it was he who must make his country's decisions. Given his need to appear to act independently, this seemed like logical advice. [Ref. 11: p. 210] The problem was that the shah had already lost most of his options. He had relied so long on external support as a substitute for domestic consent that it was now too late to either coopt his opposition or to crush it. [Ref. 42: p. 215]

F. INTERIM SUMMARY

Recalling Huntington's theories regarding the "king's dilemma", it's clear that the shah chose to modernize by making himself the chief force behind the social mobilization process. An organizational diagram of the bureaucratic apparatus the shah created to implement his programs would resemble a pyramid, with the shah at the pinnacle. The weakness of this scheme was revealed when the man at the top was removed. The subordinate organizations simply ceased to function. Nonetheless, the shah's bureaucracy made astonishing gains in upgrading the economic, cultural and social attainment levels of the Iranian people, particularly from 1963 to 1973. 1973 was a critical year because it was at this point that the shah tried to use Iran's new abundance of oil-generated revenues to circumvent the "king's dilemma."

In retrospect, this is when the timing would have been right to initiate a program of political reforms and decrease the rate of economic growth. It is clear that the shah had little feel for the inflationary impacts or balance of payments implications of his "stabilization" policy after the 1973 oil price hikes. The regime should have clarified its economic goals and focused more on shorter run stabilization issues. [Ref. 5: p. 246] Instead, the shah plunged into an ad hoc program of industrialization and military

spending that greatly increased the rate of inflation and turned growing numbers of Iranians from all social strata against the regime.

The obvious inequalities created by the shah's spending spree played right into the hands of his traditional opposition, who opposed the shah's modernization programs for a variety of religious and material reasons already discussed. In the classic confrontation between liberty and "despotic equality" which followed, even many of the regime's cadre turned against the shah.

By 1978, none of the concepts Huntington lists as requirements for political modernization were present. The shah had centralized authority, but it was not rationalized. His bureaucratic structure was riddled with corruption. Advancement was far more dependent on connection than achievement. There was no real political participation; the people neither controlled the government, nor increasingly did the government control the people. The shah himself no longer appeared to his people to possess any of the attributes listed by Hudson as desired in an ideal Islamic monarchy.

These observations about the causes of the shah's fall have been discussed in terms of five categories of factors: domestic, economic, Islamic, foreign and leadership. The first four contributed to or were symptomatic of the growing asymmetry between rates of modernization (which is the core

of the "king's dilemma"). That the shah was unable or unwilling to enact policies to reverse that trend was largely due to factors discussed in the leadership category. The five categories also provide meaningful descriptors of the modernizing path followed by King Hassan II of Morocco. By conducting a similar review of Morocco's status, we ought to discover the degree of development asymmetry that exists in that country and be able to evaluate the effectiveness of King Hassan's leadership in coping with it.

IV. THE KING

For the U.S., having made a virtually unqualified verbal commitment to the shah's political survival, the revolution in Iran was a catastrophic foreign policy failure. In addition, it was a contributing factor in President Carter's election defeat in 1980. It's not surprising, therefore, that the similarities between U.S. support for King Hassan and that given the shah are disturbing.

Both monarchies seem to have in common a similar lack of broad-based support. For example, it can be argued that Hassan's elite-based patrimonial system perpetuates the inequities which many believe were the catalyst for the shah's fall. In addition, Hassan's highly personalistic, centralized rule places him at the pinnacle of the state bureaucracy and therefore suffers from the same weaknesses as did the shah's. Critics of American support fear that U.S. policy-makers are confusing America's national interest with the king's welfare. They warn that the emphasis of U.S. support for Morocco seems to be on the king, not the country. The fact that the crown's domestic opposition includes Islamic groups who denounce the king as a puppet of the U.S. is another unsettling reminder of the recent Iranian nightmare. [Ref. 43: pp. 178-9]

American intelligence analysts, probably oversensitive after missing early indications of the shah's impending fall, have been zealous in pointing out such indications of King Hassan's vulnerability, reinforcing the perception that the king's hold on the reins of power in Morocco is at best tenuous [Ref. 44: p. 19]. Such zealotry is understandable when one considers the important strategic and political interests of the United States which would be jeopardized if King Hassan's regime were to be replaced by one less friendly. Although the magnitude of U.S. interests in North Africa differs from that of the rest of the Middle East, the nature of American interests in the region is virtually identical.

U.S. involvement in the Middle East since World War II is clearly traceable to three sets of issues: the U.S. Soviet rivalry, American commitment to Israel and oil. [Ref. 45: p. 14] U.S. interests in the region, therefore, have remained basically the same since the Presidency of Truman and the early days of "containment."

1. Denial of the area to Soviet influence/hegemony.
2. Access to the area's petroleum resources by the West on reasonable terms.
3. Commitment to Israel's well-being as well as overall regional stability. [Ref. 46: p. 154]

In North Africa, which is included with the Middle East for bureaucratic as well as geographic and cultural reasons, the scale of U.S. political, military and economic

involvement has been smaller than in the Persian Gulf. The thrust of the issues in North Africa, however, is much the same. First, the area's strategic location makes it important for the defense of Western Europe, thus the objective of denying it to the Soviets remains as valid here as farther east. Next, although petroleum resources are not as great in North Africa as farther east, they are nonetheless significant. Loss of direct access to North Africa's petroleum resources or loss of access to other resources via the Straights would pose a serious threat to Western and U.S. interests. Third, although North Africa's Arab regimes are somewhat insulated from the Arab-Israeli dispute, the region's leaders must still publicly support the Arab cause. Often these leaders possess private channels of influence with players more actively involved in the dispute which are unavailable to the superpowers or other external actors. Finally, it is in the U.S. interest, in this region as in all others, that people live in peace and that acceptable political and social values prevail. [Ref. 46: pp. 154-5]

The United States has its closest and most important relations in the region with Morocco. Congressional observers emphasized the importance of Morocco's strategic location following a 1982 fact-finding mission to Morocco.

Perched on Africa's northwest shoulder, Morocco sits as a southern gatekeeper to the Straights of Gibraltar leading into the Mediterranean Sea. Unrestricted shipping through this narrow ribbon of water between Morocco and Spain is vital to the commerce and security

of Europe and the Middle East. It is also a key passage for the U.S. Navy's Sixth Fleet which patrols the Mediterranean as a floating strike force and counterweight to Soviet naval prestige in the region. [Ref. 47: p. 4]

U.S. interests require a friendly ruler in the Straights of Gibraltar for the obvious geo-political reasons just cited. In the absence of clear alternatives to King Hassan's rule, there has been general agreement that U.S. interests would be best served if the king remained in power. He is viewed on most issues as a pro-Western moderate who shares with Washington a similar assessment of the Soviet Union and its surrogates. In addition, King Hassan has exercised his private channels of influence in support of the initial Camp David process and recently played a key role in laying the ground work for Egypt's return to the Islamic Conference Organization. Throughout the years, he has permitted American naval vessels to call at Moroccan ports, allowed U.S. communications facilities on Moroccan soil and has approved the execution of U.S.-Moroccan joint military exercises. In 1982, King Hassan granted the U.S. rights to the use of Moroccan facilities by the Rapid Deployment Force in certain unspecified contingencies. [Ref. 48: p. 193]

For all of these reasons, the life expectancy of the Moroccan regime is an important issue in the policy debate over U.S.-Moroccan relations. The debate focuses on two questions.

1. Is U.S. support for King Hassan the best way to promote stability in the country?

2. Should the U.S. hedge its bets in case Hassan falls?

The policies of the last three presidential administrations indicate that each eventually decided it was worth the price to provide moderate levels of military and economic assistance aimed at keeping King Hassan in office. In relative terms, The Reagan administration has taken the most optimistic view of Hassan's prospects, demonstrating its determination to keep him in office with substantially increased military and economic assistance. A strong factor providing a logical basis for the current administration's commitment to King Hassan is the relative soundness of his domestic sources of stability in comparison to the shah's.

A. DOMESTIC FACTORS

1. Power Base

King Hassan's legitimacy has deeper roots in history than that of the shah, dating back 35 generations to the Prophet. In this respect, he more nearly resembles the ideal Islamic monarch described by Hudson. Members of the Alawite dynasty, to which Hassan belongs, have ruled Morocco since the 17th century. Although most of that period was marked by tension between the "bilad al-makhsan" (lands of government) and "bilad al-siba" (lands of dissonance), the suzerainty of the Alawite sultan has been accepted without

interruption for over 300 years. [Ref. 49: p. 20] One legacy of the pre-colonial Maghreb which carried over into the 20th century was this condition of normative unity and political division [Ref. 50: p. 121].

Although Morocco's Islamic past is marked with distinction, including a period of imperial rule, it entered the 20th century with a medieval social system in an extreme state of decay [Ref. 51: p. 201]. The effect of French colonial rule during the first half of the 20th century was actually to strengthen the control of the government. French administration came at a time when Moroccan weakness left it particularly vulnerable to European colonial expansion. The French, by ending the division between the "siba" and the "makhsan" extended the Sultan's temporal authority for the first time to the countryside. [Ref. 52: pp. 50- 7]

The circumstances of Morocco's independence served to further enhance the legitimacy of the sultanate. To counteract nationalist uprisings in 1953, the French exiled Sultan Mohammed V and replaced him with a more malleable relative. That act turned out to be the catalyst for an all-out drive for independence. The French were forced to allow Mohammed V to return from exile in 1955, marking for all practical purposes the end of colonial control. Formal independence came in 1956 as Sultan Mohammed V became King Mohammed V, the new title symbolizing a break with the past and a more modern future [Ref. 51: p. 189].

The ascendancy of Mohammed V clearly linked the crown with independence and nationalism [Ref. 9: p. 223]. "Mohammed V had become something no Alawite sultan, however peaceful had been before, an authentic popular hero...a maraboutic king." [Ref. 53: pp. 80-81] The monarchy's symbolic association with the nationalist struggle left Mohammed V's son, Hassan II in a good strategic position to exploit the crown's prestige as he consolidated its power. Unlike most newly independent nations, the monarchy rather than a modernized elite had played the central role as a symbol of nationalism [Ref. 50: p. 137].

Hassan, unlike the shah, retained a traditional constituency, composed of the large Alawite family, rural notables, businessmen, a growing urban bourgeoisie and the army officer corps, all linked by a ubiquitous web of corruption. [Ref. 9: p. 226] In contrast to the case in neighboring Algeria, the nationalist revolution in Morocco was neither accompanied nor followed by a social revolution and did not result in a redistribution of power. The economic impacts of the relatively brief period of French protectorate did not result in the high levels of class conflict evoked by the much longer occupation that had occurred in Algeria. [Ref. 54: p. 283] New opportunities in the post-independence period led to some adjustments within Moroccan social strata, but the traditional power relationships were left intact.

The king's authority has traditional roots in his position as a member of the Alawite dynasty and his role as spiritual leader, or imam, of the Islamic community. The king's prestige and power are further enhanced by his control of commercial activities and patronage. As the nation's ultimate and most prominent dispenser of patronage, the king has been able to coopt those not already committed to him by the force of nationalism or traditionalism with material appeals. [Ref. 55: p. A7]

At present, the Islamic clergy in Morocco occupies only secondary importance. Most of the ulama to date remain faithful supporters of Hassan and the institutions of the monarchy. The king openly consults with the clergy and gives the public appearance of total support for Islam. [Ref. 56: pp. 58-9] Lacking his father's charisma as a hero of the revolution, Hassan has placed official emphasis on his role as a religious leader to enhance his regime's legitimacy. Article 19 of the Moroccan Constitution defines the king as the "Amir al-Mouminine, Supreme Representative of the Nation, symbol of its unity and guarantor of the permanence and continuity of the state." [Ref. 57: p. 65]

The rural areas have been a major source of support for the king because of their relative acquiescence to his system of centralized power. Unlike the modern urban elites who hold aspirations for exercising power, rural notables and their more traditional followers are disinterested in

such reforms as constitutional monarchy and economic decolonization. [Ref. 50: p. 139] In a sense, the peasantry is a disfavored group because their lack of clamor for change allows the crown to ignore them. [Ref. 58: p. 11]. Despite the crown's benign neglect of the rural masses, Hassan as "Commander of the Faithful" is deeply venerated by them as "sharif" (descendant of the Prophet) and as a dispenser of "baraka" (personal charisma) [Ref. 59: p. 406].

The group that poses the most visible and immediate threat to the crown is the army. The coup attempts of 1971 and 1972 had come as complete shocks, because they came from forces whose loyalty the crown had always taken for granted.

The army will always work in silence; it will remain faithful to its oath and motto: My God, My Country, My King--Moulay Hassan, 1962. [Ref. 60: p. 62]

After the failed coup of 1972, the king took immediate action to restructure the Royal Armed Forces (FAR) with renewed emphasis in its non-political character, its loyalty to the king and its Muslim virtue [Ref. 54: p. 316]. In addition, Hassan took advantage of a number of external situations to rebuild the prestige of the senior officer corps and tie them more tightly than ever to the crown.

Foremost has been the Sahara War, an irredentist cause that the king has elevated to the level of national crusade. In addition, Morocco's troops fought with distinction in the 1973 Middle East War and, in 1977 and 1978,

successfully intervened on behalf of President Mobutu in Zaire. King Hassan has been lavish in his praise of their bravery and loyalty and has substantially increased the military's material resources as well.

As a result of these measures, the army appears to be staunchly loyal at the present. However, the morale of the services is directly linked to continued success in the Desert War. Should Morocco experience defeat, the army would almost certainly seek to shift the blame for their defeat to the king and would undoubtedly overthrow him. [Ref. 61: p. 5] In the meantime, senior military officers partake of the privileges and opportunities for enrichment available to those at the upper levels of Hassan's clientelist system.

2. Social Mobilization

Prior to independence, social stratification in traditional Moroccan society consisted of generally similar patterns in the Berber highlands, the rural Arab areas, and the cities and towns. The top rank, or elite, were the "shurfa" and the descendants of the marabouts. Next were the religious intelligentsia, landlords, great merchants and high government officials. The class that most closely corresponded to the middle class followed--tribal commoners in Berber society, "fellahin" (small farmers) in the rural areas, and retail merchants, artisans, etc. in the urban

localities. The lowest level of society included Jews, gypsies, and "imazilen" (shameless ones). [Ref. 62: p. 121]

After independence, a new social pyramid was gradually superimposed on these elements. A mitigating factor was the fact that independence occurred simultaneously with the beginning of a period of exponential population growth. This was accompanied by a massive population transfer from rural to urban areas. Elite society, therefore, took on an urban flavor and was further characterized by family connections, activism against the French during the revolution, Istiqlal Party membership⁷ and a school or university connection with France.

Although Europeans had staffed most modern institutions before independence, the French departure from Morocco in 1956 created an insatiable demand for the small group of Moroccans with a French education [Ref. 18: p. 243-4]. Those lucky few who qualified immediately assumed important posts in the modern, governmental and cultural structures of the burgeoning urban areas. This group constituted a new bourgeois elite or middle class which soon engaged in the conspicuous consumption of European consumer goods. [Ref. 62: p. 115-6] Two other elements rounded out the middle class: university trained professionals (doctors,

⁷The Istiqlal Party had been the most prominent nationalist political organization during Morocco's revolutionary era.

lawyers, ect.) and the merchant class. The merchant class is composed of two mutually antagonistic groups, the Fassi--natives of Fez, and the Soussi--natives of the Sous valley. Both groups amassed great wealth, have close ties with the government, pray for the king's health and would be likely targets of any revolutionary group. [Ref. 55: p. B3-4]

The pattern of social change in Morocco followed another traditional Moroccan pattern: "the enrichment of the few and the impoverishment of the many." [Ref. 18: p. 89] Members of the traditional middle class saw demands for their traditional skills diminish in relation to the rise of modern urban society. The rate of growth of the numbers of the impoverished outstripped the rate of overall population growth, largely due to the inexorable exodus of poor and landless peasants into the cities [Ref. 9: p. 175] The criterion for access to the various strata of Moroccan society had shifted from the traditional criterion of ethnicity/caste to a more modern standard of ability to pay [Ref. 18: p. 253].

Changing social values accompanied the changes in Morocco's demography. The appeal of the benefits of modernization were felt at all levels of society. Family ties diminished in importance due to increased geographic and social mobility. Women began to enjoy greater freedom than in the past, including greater access to educational

opportunities. They displayed a tendency to marry later, work longer, and have fewer children. Western clothing, music and ideas appeared with increasing frequency. Nonetheless, certain features of traditional society remained. One was the linkage of the traditional patronage system with Morocco's modern system of administration.

John Waterbury, whose Commander of the Faithful is considered the definitive work on Morocco's system of segmented elites, views Hassan's system of patronage as a deliberate system of planned corruption, cynically designed to coopt any possible opposition to the regime.

Corruption serves one possible function, survival of the regime. The vulnerable seek protection and thus regenerate links of dependency and patronage. Hassan's dilemma is whether in the short term, survival can be made compatible with rational administration and economic development? In the long term, can it be made compatible with planned corruption? [Ref. 63: p. 555]

One might take a less condemnatory position and note that the regime's clientelist practices have roots deeply imbedded in Moroccan culture. The situation in Morocco is that the various social groups in competition for the benefits of modernization lack the institutional channels to achieve the modern values they have internalized. Thus, they are forced to resort to traditional means to achieve modern ends. Hassan merely exploits this heritage, using his access to resources and control of appointments to insure the survival of his regime. [Ref. 50: p. 138-9]

The preceding comments about corruption point out the dual nature of the impacts of corruption as social development takes place. On one hand, the patrimonial system has enabled Hassan to replace resistance to royal authority with competition for royal favor. On the other hand, the present patrimonial system simply lacks the capacity to absorb the next generation of Moroccan elites. Waterbury has written of the implications for instability of Morocco's inevitable absorption crisis.

The post-1956 emphasis on mass education combined with a veritable demographic explosion has pumped unprecedented numbers of Moroccans into all levels of the educational system. Education has been a key to elite status in the past, and it is unlikely that many of these youths will settle for anything less in the future. Moreover, the new aspirants will not have the common social background of the present elite, the nationalist movement means little to them, and it is improbable that existing alliance and obligation systems will be able to absorb more than a small number of them. Either the elite of today will ignore the future aspirants, and will as a result become obsolete, or it will attempt to absorb them and thus will change utterly its behavior, its size, and its nature. [Ref. 64: p. 164]

Like Iran, Morocco has undergone a revolution in education. In 1969 there were 11,000 Moroccans enrolled in courses of higher education. By 1979, the population of students pursuing degrees at this level had increased to 70,000 [Ref. 56: p. 77]. Approximately 70 percent of Morocco's university level students were still majoring in the arts and letters rather than technical areas where skills are sorely needed [Ref. 56: p. 79]. Thus, three

factors contribute to the absorption crisis which looms on the horizon for King Hassan

1. The sheer numbers of the emerging elite. The present elite core can not possibly absorb thousands of new members.
2. Professional obsolescence. Few of the emerging elites are trained for the types of jobs likely to be available.
3. The scarcity of jobs. Competence notwithstanding, the government sector will not expand enough to create jobs at a level consistent with the new elites' aspirations. [Ref. 56: p. 81]

The absorption problem is related to the larger problem of inequitable distribution of political and economic opportunity which is characteristic of patrimonial systems. As long as it was possible to distribute more and more pieces of an ever-growing pie, it was possible to ignore the aspirations of the the relatively powerless have-nots. However, due to socio-economic and demographic forces, the patronage pie is shrinking, and have-nots are growing in numbers, political sophistication and influence. (The stereotyped view of the urban migrant as an "inarticulate clod-hopper" has become obsolete in this age of mass communication, decreasing illiteracy and growing political activism.) [Ref. 35: p. 185] Under these conditions, only a total transformation of the economy will be sufficient to provide the jobs needed to absorb Morocco's growing population of job-seekers. As will be discussed in Chapter V, Morocco's current economic plight makes this development unlikely for the foreseeable future.

3. Political Participation

During the first two decades of his rule, King Hassan rejected the strategy of aligning with the modern secular elites of the nationalist era. Such an alliance would have facilitated the crown's exchange of traditional legitimacy for modern, rationalized authority (i.e., the rationalized authority of a constitutional monarchy). Instead, King Hassan continued to capitalize on his pre-eminence as a religious and national symbol. This approach has been described as an "historic throwback to the pre-modern, pre-protectorate sultanate." [Ref. 9: p. 224]

After his father's experiments with parliamentary democracy in the early years of independence, Hassan gradually appropriated all power into his own hands, finally declaring a state of emergency in 1965 and disbanding parliament altogether. This policy appeared to directly contradict the goals which Mohammed V had set forth upon his return from exile in 1956.

The mission of this government in particular will be to elaborate institutional reforms for the purpose of making Morocco a democratic state with a constitutional monarchy and to conduct negotiations with France destined to make Morocco acquire the status of an independent state united to France by permanent ties of a freely consented and defined interdependence. [Ref. 51: p. 184]

However, the king's statements to an American journalist in 1962 indicate that Hassan's intention was not to permanently

abandon his father's ideal, rather that the king thought conditions within Morocco made it necessary to adjust the timetable for the ideal's implementation.

I could be a dictator if I chose....My people wish me to rule them because they have very little tradition of self-rule. But...dictatorship does not pay....I am building a house for you my children. I am going to put furniture in it--even though you may not wish me to do so. Oh, I know you may prefer to sleep on the floor, our ancestors have done so and survived, but my duty is to show you better ways. [Ref. 10: p. 281]

These remarks suggest that Hassan's intended legacy for his people was still modern, democratic institutions, but only when Morocco was, in his view, ready to receive them.

In the meantime, King Hassan mastered the art of providing a brand of "participative democracy" that was more apparent than real [Ref. 65: p. 65]. Although the 1962, 1970 and 1972 Moroccan constitutions each ostensibly increased the political influence of the citizenry, all had the ultimate effect of actually enhancing the control of King Hassan [Ref. 66: p. 690]. Since the military coup attempts, there have been a number of royal initiatives intended to deflect pressure for political reform.

Early in 1972, the king had proposed a more liberal constitution, in which two thirds, rather than one third, of the seats would be filled by direct election. Later the same year, following the military's second attempted coup, the king mobilized the broad base of his support, dividing

his opposition by coopting them with royal patronage, compromising them with corrupt relationships, or simply forcing their silence with repressive measures. [Ref. 9: p. 226] In 1973, in a move designed to appease proponents of land reform, Hassan nationalized the remaining Moroccan land held by foreigners and announced that all major businesses were to be at least 51 percent Moroccanized [Ref. 52: p. 77]. Hassan's program of Moroccanization was intended to spawn a loyalist class of "middle peasants" who owed their prosperity to royal patronage [Ref. 67: p. 179].

Today, Morocco's eight major political parties serve as "safety valves" within the political system. It should be noted, however, that political party activities involve only a minority of the population due to a literacy rate of only 30 percent and general political apathy. The parties themselves typically suffer from internal disunity, personal rivalries, and poorly expressed programs. [Ref. 55: p. B12]

The inherent weaknesses of the parties have made it relatively easy for the king to divide and manipulate the leaders of the various factions, eliminating them altogether if they threaten his political power. Nonetheless, the crown allows members of the various factions to criticize the system but tolerates absolutely no direct criticism of the king. [Ref. 68: p. B1] By tolerating political opposition, within certain undefined but well-understood rules of the game, Hassan has been able to discourage most of his

political antagonists from completely dropping out of the system and engaging in more radical forms of opposition [Ref. 66: pp. 693-4].

In contrast to Iran, Moroccans enjoy considerable political freedom: the king has publicly pledged himself toward the maintenance of democratic forms; the press is relatively uncensored; and many political prisoners have been freed. In addition, recent events point to a gradual political evolution which raises the possibility that the seeds for a long-term transition to more participative government have been sown.

The results of the September/October 1984 elections were relatively free of the charges of fraud which have clouded the Moroccan electoral process in the past. The elections featured major gains by the moderate left which should enhance the regime's democratic image. Although the legislature's powers are still very limited, the fact that the king was prepared to allow even far left parties to participate is seen as a further cautious step toward the democratization of the regime.

The king sees Morocco's parties as "political schools" and exploits their utility as "safety valves" masterfully. For example, prior to this year's elections, he ruled out independent candidates for the parliament. By channelling Morocco's diverse political forces into parties, the king avoids the danger of discontented sectors of the

population becoming prey to political forces beyond his control. [Ref. 69: p. 15-6]

King Hassan has made a number of political concessions which seem to be moving the Moroccan polity toward a more participative, less autocratic form. On the other hand, the deck remains stacked so that the actual configuration of power favors the king. Whether the king's liberal initiatives stem from a true commitment to democracy or represent tactical concessions to suppress dissent, the structure of the system itself still makes democracy a commodity that the king can grant or withhold at his pleasure [Ref. 56: pp. 70-1].

B. THE ROLE OF ISLAM

1. Legitimizing Influence

In Morocco, the king's attempts to integrate Islam into the political system through its connection with his office have been largely successful. Over the centuries, the Sunni religious establishment of the Maghreb has generally been seen as a part of the governing elite and has tended to support the temporal ruler. [Ref. 46: p. 88] This has been especially true in Morocco, where the king's position is somewhat akin to that of the former Ottoman sultans who were also caliphs. The Moroccan monarch has been revered as Commander of the Faithful since 1349 when Abu

Inan first adopted the title. [Ref. 51: p. 86] In addition, Malekite jurisprudence, the school of Islamic thought observed in Morocco, is the most nationalistic of the four schools of Sunni Islam [Ref. 10: p. 10].

Islam became a valuable weapon in the nationalist struggle when the French tried to impose the Berber "dahir" in the 1930s. That dahir (decree) allowed Berbers to follow their own laws, rather than adhere to the Sharia-based laws of the sultanate. Nationalists saw this (correctly) as an attempt to divide the Berbers from the Arabs and increase French control. Berber and Arab nationalists fought back, emphasizing the bonds of Islamic unity between Morocco's Arab and Berber brethren. This strategy, which proved highly effective, had the full support of Mohammed V, a nationalist in his own right. [Ref. 57: p. 61-2]

Islam and national policy remain closely linked today. For example, part of the justification for Morocco's claim of sovereignty over the Western Sahara is based on the Islamic links which existed between the Moroccan sultan and the "bilad al siba" centuries ago. Of course the overlay of nationalism and Islam also adds to the dilemma of Morocco's current ruler. Islam today finds itself increasingly in conflict with the secular, modernist manifestations of the nationalist movement with which it once aligned. [Ref. 50: p. 99]

As previously noted, there is at present no indication of unrest among the "ulama." The Moroccan Sultan/King has for centuries been a religious leader as well as a temporal ruler. This fact was even incorporated into the 1972 constitution. Thus, the monarchy stands as a formidable combination of "emir and imam." [Ref. 52: p. 50]

The king's position as imam may be irrelevant to the secular-minded emerging elites, but it is still effective in deterring criticism by the Islamic establishment. For the time being, the fact that to oppose the monarchy is to oppose the imam insulates Hassan from most of the turbulence created by Islamic resurgence in the rest of the Arab world. [Ref. 57: p. 65] However, the perception of overdependence on the West, increasing levels of socio-economic discontent, and the perceived corrupting effects of secular development are all factors which could eventually weaken the good relationship the king presently enjoys with Morocco's Islamic "umma."

2. The Fundamentalist Specter

The fact that religious ferment is much less apparent in Morocco than it was in Iran may be somewhat deceiving. In Morocco, significant religious opposition to the monarchy is less visible because it occurs outside the religious establishment. The level of religion most relevant to the urban or rural poor is likely to be one

Morocco's working class religious groups, orders or sufi brotherhoods. These groups are not tied to the king as is the formal religious establishment and are in fact looked down upon by the official ulama. While it is true that the king derives legitimacy from this populist religious stratum (which ascribes baraka to the king), this segment of society is also the most affected by economic and social inequity in Morocco. The influence of the popular orders, which have historically resisted the king's temporal authority, has reinforced the common belief of the masses that there is much corruption and immorality in the palace. [Ref. 46: p. 95]

For the time being, the groups opposing the regime do not speak with one voice, however they do have two general principles in common: a desire for basic social, economic and political reforms, and a desire to see Islam restored as the guiding principle for building a better society [Ref. 70: p. C3] In Morocco, the surface manifestations of these activities are similar to those which were observed in Iran and elsewhere: the sprouting of beards, increasing return to the veil, pro-Khomeini graffiti, inflammatory sermons, increased mosque attendance by youth and occasional eruptions of violent protest [Ref. 46: p. 96]. In part, the appeal of fundamentalism lies with Islam's opposition to what are now perceived to have been the evils of the secular, modernist domination of post-independence society.

The tenets of populist Sunni Islam, like Shiism, have a significant social content:

1. Fundamental faith in the Koran.
2. Opposition to corruption/oppression.
3. Commitment to equality/justice.
4. Condemnation of imperialist intervention. [Ref. 71: p. 111.]

Fundamentalists scorn what they see as King Hassan's lack of dedication to these principles, using that assertion to stir up further discontent among the masses. The growing economic and political discontent under his rule has added to the resurgent interest in Islam at other levels of Moroccan society. Islam's potential as a vehicle for organizing and coordinating opposition to the crown can not be ignored. Demographic changes give this last factor even greater significance. The king's religious prestige has always been greatest in the countryside, yet 44 percent of the Moroccan population now live in the cities, as compared to 14 percent in 1956. [Ref. 66: pp. 693-4]

As in Iran, the gap between the new urban immigrants and the older Westernized elite is continuously increasing. The urban masses form a natural reservoir of disaffection, suspicious of the Westernized elite and the secular system which seems to have deprived them of their fair share of society's rewards. [Ref. 35: p. 186] Although the Islamic groups who could exploit this dissatisfaction have yet to

effectively organize or coordinate their opposition, the crown takes their potential seriously. For instance, the government has formed its own "official" Popular Islamic Reform Movement as evidence that it shares the people's commitment to Islamic values. In addition, it has increased the religious content in the public school curriculum. Finally, the government has sought to place its own agents in the various Islamic reform organizations. These primarily cosmetic steps fail to address the underlying economic and social conditions which have made Morocco fertile ground for the fundamentalist movement. Therefore, even though the religious threat to the crown is currently under control, it is likely to persist and continue to grow for the foreseeable future.

C. LEADERSHIP FACTORS

1. A Prince Groomed To Be King

In February 1961, Mohammed V died unexpectedly following routine surgery. Crown Prince Moulay Hassan succeeded him in Morocco's traditional manner. We have already discussed some of the advantages related to prestige and legitimacy bequeathed to the young monarch by his father. In addition to these elements of authority, Mohammed V had designed and executed a careful program to groom his eldest son for the eventual assumption of the

Moroccan throne. Since Hassan's succession to the throne, he has demonstrated that he also inherited the strong will and innate leadership qualities required to succeed in that role.

As a young man, Hassan attended the Imperial College of Morocco, an institution which Mohammed V founded especially for his sons. The sultan realized that Moroccan schools were rather backward in their curriculum but hesitated to enroll his son in a European school where the program of studies would have little relevance to life in Morocco. He decided to create an institution in Morocco which would combine the best of both cultures. The sultan insured that the new Imperial College was staffed with the best native and French scholars from Rabat's lycee and hired a distinguished French educator to serve as the institution's director.

Young Hassan was given no preference but quickly displayed the intellectual superiority which had marked his education as a youth. A voracious reader, polished linguist and avid athlete, he finished at the top of his class and continued his studies in law. His law curriculum and studies were directed by the University of Bordeaux. After finishing his thesis, he appeared before the university's examining board and was awarded his "Diplome" (corresponding to a Master of Arts degree). [Ref. 72: pp. 36-41]

This stage of his education over, Hassan learned to fly, received French naval training and increasingly became a close confidant and trusted advisor to his father the king. When it became apparent in 1951 that the French colonialists were not about to make any concessions to Moroccan desires for independence, it was the crown prince who opened the sultan's eyes to the necessity for an uncompromising and ruthless policy of resistance.

Their period of exile in Madagascar (1953-55) brought the father and son even closer together. When France finally sent emissaries to Madagascar in 1955 to discuss Mohammed V's possible return to Morocco, Moulay Hassan was an active participant in the discussions. It was he who pressed his father to make no concessions and to insist that his return to the throne and Morocco's immediate independence were the only basis for future Franco-Moroccan relations. [Ref. 72: pp. 41-51]

After independence, King Mohammed V appointed his son to be the first Chief of Staff of the FAR. Hassan's troops were composed of 24,000 soldiers who had received their training under the colonial armies of Spain and France and 8,000 veterans of the former National Liberation Army. Hassan devoted his energy to molding this eclectic force into the most efficient army Morocco's limited means would allow. The positive impact of Hassan's leadership was first demonstrated when Morocco sent two battalions of the FAR to

the Congo in 1960. Hassan's deputy, General Kittani, was appointed second-in-command of the UN forces in the Congo and Morocco's troops were recognized as among the best that had been sent to the country. [Ref. 72: pp. 52-4]

Later that year, Mohammed V appointed Hassan as Vice Premier. Without giving up his post as Chief of Staff, Hassan presided over cabinet meetings, guided the day to day affairs of the government and influenced the final shape and direction of its policies. Upon the untimely death of Mohammed V, Morocco realized the dividends of the crown prince's rigorous apprenticeship: the country was left with an heir-designate well acquainted with and prepared for the demands of national leadership. [Ref. 72: pp. 54-60]

2. Will and Leadership

The international press and American diplomatic officials seriously underestimated the abilities of the young monarch. As crown prince, U.S. military leaders had concluded that Hassan was "haughty and weak...but that his fallacious, mystic, neutral psychology could be modified by a determined effort to win his confidence." [Ref. 10: p. 288] Immediately after Mohammed's sudden death, many experts predicted a coup against his "inconsequential playboy" son within 48 hours.

Since that time, the conventional wisdom has been that as progressive urbanization and modernization caused

growing numbers of Moroccans to question the king's divine right to rule, Hassan's crown would inevitably follow the path of so many other monarchies in the developing world and be overturned [Ref. 66: p. 694]. However, there were no profits to be made by betting against the Moroccan king over the last quarter century. Hassan has demonstrated a remarkable instinct for capitalizing on adversity and making the decisions necessary to disarm and divide his opposition.

While still Chief of staff, Prince Moulay Hassan made the force of his decisive leadership felt during the aftermath of the 1960 earthquake in Agadir. He saw that the situation called for trained, disciplined men. Therefore, he immediately commanded that his troops cordon off the ruined area, ordered residents excluded and had looters shot. Despite local criticism of his harsh measures, Hassan recognized the danger of epidemic due to Moroccans' general lack of sophistication about the health dangers involved. Hassan never flinched from taking the immediate measures he believed to be necessary to avert the possible spread of disease, despite the criticism.

Hassan's actions during and following the military coup attempts of the early 1970s also illustrate his ability to think and act fast when facing an emergency. When dissident Air Force pilots strafed the king's Boeing 727 in 1972, Hassan displayed his cool wit under pressure by getting on the radio himself and announcing, "You've killed the king. Don't hurt anyone else." [Ref. 73: p. 48]

Following this coup attempt, the king showed his determination to ruthlessly suppress those he considered dangerous elements. Hassan had 220 Air Force members arrested and eventually had 11 officers executed [Ref. 67: p. 178]. Among Hassan's people, especially among the masses of uneducated Moroccans, the king's narrow escapes strengthened their mystical regard for his crown. "If our king miraculously escaped death twice, it is because he has baraka. God is with him." [Ref. 9: p. 227]

Hassan's reaction to the fact that the unquestioned loyalty of the military had proved to be a myth was not merely to increase repression. This sort of turbulence from his natural constituency on the right could not be dismissed. Hassan understood that a more thoughtful response was called for once the immediate danger had been removed. Therefore he decided to gradually end the state of emergency, allowing greater political participation, rather than imposing stricter controls. [Ref. 58: p. 30]

Hassan has shown no tendency to freeze in time of crisis. In fact, he has proven to be a master of exploiting external crises to take the edge off other problems. In that respect, the timing of the Western Saharan issue could not have been better. The King acted decisively to take over the phosphate rich territory. In the process, he:

1. Reaffirmed his crown's identification with nationalism.

2. Built unanimous support for the crown's decision by arousing in Moroccans a renewed nationalist fervor.
3. Repaired his frayed relations with the officer corps.
4. Renewed the national consensus that was being threatened by festering political and economic dissatisfaction.

As a legitimacy building device, Hassan's use of the Western Sahara issue has been brilliant. [Ref. 9: p. 228]

Hassan has proven his mastery of the levers of power by his deft manipulation of his many roles: Commander of the Faithful, nationalist crusader, political ruler, "grand patron", liberal reformer and father figure. The recently departed American Ambassador to Morocco, Joseph Reed, has described King Hassan as an "enlightened, experienced monarch...in touch with his people." [Ref. 74: p. 25]

The king has demonstrated his sensitivity to the long-term problems of growing socio-economic inequality. Following the Casablanca riots of 1981, he radically modified the city's government, giving greater responsibility to energetic young officials and giving them a charter to clean up the city and end unemployment [Ref. 46: p. 32]. In a moment of frank self-criticism, he later conceded that a more effective school system would serve national interests better than additional security forces [Ref. 3: p. 31].

Hassan has displayed an apparently boundless capacity for flexibility. The recent pact with Libya stands as a prime example. This initiative deflates

Hassan's image as a tool of the West, removes from the Polisario an important source of arms and promises to alleviate some of Morocco's unemployment problems. Such imaginative foreign policy initiatives have won for Hassan near superstar status in the arena of international diplomacy.

By surviving into the 1980s, Hassan has already proven that monarchies are not as immediately vulnerable to the forces of modernization as some theorists had suggested. [Ref. 9: p. 229] For the immediate future, his rule seems secure. His longer term challenge is to hold off modernization's opposing forces, while nurturing the gradual development of a political system in which Morocco's resources are more equitably distributed, a system that might someday enable the Moroccan king to reign rather than require him to rule.

V. MOROCCO'S ECONOMY AND THE IMPACT OF THE DESERT WAR

Some years ago, General Charles de Gaulle referred to Morocco as a country "with its revolution still to come." [Ref. 75: p. A19] In contrast, more recent political analysis has tended to downplay the possibility of extensive political violence, at least in the short term [Ref. 76: p. 950]. Although the potential for political turmoil appears to be high, the most current Frost and Sullivan World Political Risk Forecast still rates King Hassan's regime as most likely to prevail over possible military or fundamentalist alternative regimes⁸ [Ref. 55: p. C1].

As previously discussed, concern about the possibility of sudden political change has fueled the ongoing Washington policy debate over support for King Hassan's regime. The debate is given both impetus and urgency by what is essentially the "Hobson's choice" confronting Morocco's ruler. On one hand, the king must broaden the basis of Morocco's economy to meet the grave material needs of his nation's

⁸The Frost and Sullivan forecasters assign Hassan a 55 percent probability as most likely regime over the next 18 months. Military and religious fundamentalist alternative regimes receive 35 percent and 10 percent ratings respectively. It's worth noting that optimism about the Moroccan monarchy diminishes over the longer term. The probabilities assigned to the various alternatives over the next five years are 45 percent, 30 percent and 25 percent respectively.

growing population. On the other hand, the very legitimacy of the crown seems to be tied to the irredentist war in the Western Sahara, the cost of which is scuttling Morocco's most critical social and economic goals. All the while, due to his country's dismal economic state, Hassan has had to rely on external assistance to make progress on either front. This has placed Morocco's king in a predicament similar to that once encountered by the shah. Hassan, like the shah, must measure the abstract benefits and concrete costs of appearing independent against the concrete benefits and indirect dangers of appearing to rely excessively on external assistance.

On the Saharan front, improved military tactics as well as new developments in the diplomatic picture have resulted in achieving at least stalemate in the desert war, albeit at tremendous cost. This chapter will also focus on those costs and the impact of their diversion from the country's attempts to solve its economic problems. Since the goal of this thesis is to assess the crown's stability, the non-economic impacts of the desert war will also be addressed. The starting point is Morocco's economic situation.

A. THE ECONOMY

1. The Dismal Economic Situation

Unlike most Third World nations, Morocco is a potentially rich developing country. It possesses two-thirds of the world's known reserves of phosphate rock, as well as fertile croplands, significant grazing areas, rich fishing grounds, potentially large natural gas deposits and a well-developed tourist industry. [Ref. 77: p. 503] The U.S. Department of Commerce rates Morocco's long-term economic prospects as very promising.

The Department of Commerce report notes that in both the agricultural and fishing industries, the country's abundant resources leave room for further expansion. In addition, the development of the Essaouira gas fields, if as large as anticipated, should significantly lower Morocco's dependence on imported crude oil (as the region's "hydrocarbon Cinderella", Morocco relies on foreign sources for 87 percent of its energy needs). Finally, Morocco's 65 to 75 percent share of world phosphate reserves and its developing phosacid production capacity should enable it to dominate the world phosphate market by the 1990s. [Ref. 78: pp. 7-9]

Yet today, the average Moroccan finds himself severely depressed. 50 percent of the country's almost 24 million people live below the poverty line. Seven million dwell in absolute poverty [Ref. 68: p. H3]. Illiteracy is

over 75 percent. With a \$12 billion foreign debt (about 90 percent of the GNP), Morocco's interest payments alone have absorbed 36 percent of its export earnings since 1981. [Ref. 79: p.23] These conditions have forced austerity measures which have postponed the country's ambitious growth schemes and even threaten the survival of many of its poorest citizens.

Given this dismal economic situation and Morocco's relative resource abundance, one must wonder why the country has not been able to better exploit its advantages. As one IMF official succinctly summarized, "...economic conditions moved against Morocco." [Ref. 80: p. 215] The country's problems are a typical litany of Third World tribulations:

1. Four straight years of drought.
2. Growing foreign debt/balance of trade problems.
3. Falling prices for phosphates, its largest export commodity.
4. One of the world's highest population growth rates.

Morocco's situation is further complicated by the costs of the eight-year old "open-ended" war in the Western Sahara. A brief review of the factors contributing to Morocco's economic problems will define the dimensions of the unpalatable options facing King Hassan.

2. Dimensions of the Problem

a. Drought

Since agriculture is the key to the economy in Morocco, the past four years of severe drought have had a devastating impact. Almost 60 percent of the population live in the countryside and over 50 percent of the working population are engaged in agricultural or closely related occupations. In addition, agriculture provides a high proportion of the country's food and about 30 percent of total exports. Therefore, bad agricultural years are felt in every sector.

In 1981, the worst year of drought in 35 years, agricultural production fell off as much as 50 percent with the overall decline measured at 25 percent. Vast expanses of the country's southern farmlands were desiccated and over one million of the country's three million head of cattle had to be slaughtered. Many rivers have since dried up, shutting down hydro-electric plants and increasing requirements for imported oil. Perhaps the most serious consequence in terms of destabilizing effects was that the drought accelerated the rural exodus to Casablanca, Marrakesh and Rabat, cities whose public services were already strained to the breaking point. [Ref. 70: p. A4]

Drought-induced food shortages were major factors in a number of serious examples of social unrest,

including the bloody food riots which occurred in Casablanca in 1981 and again in Nador, Tetuan, Al Hoceima and Marrakesh in January 1984. [Ref. 81: p. 35] Once largely self-sufficient and a net food exporter, Morocco's growing population has outstripped the drought-plagued agricultural sector's ability to feed it. Imported food stuffs, especially among such staples as cereals, sugar and dairy products are becoming increasingly significant and place a growing strain on an already unfavorable balance of trade. [Ref. 77: p. 504]

b. Debt/Trade

The trade imbalance is only one of the factors which have combined to produce a foreign debt which proportionately exceeds that of such well-known financial basket-cases as Argentina and Brazil. The debt, which in 1972 corresponded to only 17 percent of Morocco's GNP, has reached 90 percent, making Morocco one of the most heavily indebted countries in the world. [Ref. 82: p. 7108]

Morocco's inability to meet its obligations is further exacerbated by a relative decrease in the value of the dirham of over 60 percent in relation to the dollar since 1980 [Ref. 78: p. 5]. That, of course, means higher dirham costs for dollar-denominated imports like grain and energy. Even the energy glut has worked against Morocco. Lower energy prices have reduced revenues to OPEC, causing

Morocco's Saudi benefactors to be less generous and increasing Moroccan dependence on IMF funds. [Ref. 83: p. A19]

Another factor contributing to the balance of payment/debt problem is rising interest rates. They are a factor in the world-wide recession which has held down tourism and limited Moroccan access to other markets that are experiencing economic difficulties of their own. In addition, they add to the cost of servicing the debt. With so many factors working to increase the level and burden of the debt, and so few working to increase current accounts, the government has had no choice but to trade off growth for an austerity program by cutting back sharply on non-essential imports and government development plans.

Although the goals of the \$21.4 billion Five Year Development Plan (1981-85) have not been modified, IMF scrutiny of the plan resulted in substantial cuts.

1. Job creation
2. Diversification of industry
3. Decentralization away from the Casablanca-Khenitra industrial axis
4. Improved food and energy production [Ref. 84: p. 6]

With IMF performance targets clearly in place, the government has held the Moroccan economy on a tight leash. In 1983, the prices of formerly subsidized consumer products were raised between 17 and 67 percent; prices for petroleum

products were raised; government hiring was slashed; operations and investment budgets were lowered; and taxes were increased. 1984 saw more of the same including the elimination of an additional 8,000 bureaucratic positions through attrition. [Ref. 78: pp.7-8]

Commentators almost unfailingly point out the apparent cause-effect relationship of IMF-dictated austerity measures to the food riots of 1981 and 1984. Some suggest that Morocco needs a massive injection of capital on concessional terms to stimulate its economy. This is in response to the general fear that severe financial conditions, when applied to such precarious situations, are as likely to lead to increasing chaos as financial recovery. [Ref. 85: pp. 750-51] At any rate, no single sector from within the economy has shown the vigor to alter the trend of increasing debt.

c. Phosphates

Perhaps most disappointing of all, the depressed phosphate market means Morocco's number one export will be unable to make its hoped for heavy contribution to the budget. Although the Soviet Union and the United States produce more phosphate rock than Morocco, they both retain approximately 80 percent of their production for domestic consumption. With only modest domestic requirements, Morocco is able to commit 90 percent of its production to

export, making it the world's leading phosphate exporter. Because the depressed market for this commodity has been the key factor in Morocco's unfavorable foreign exchange position, the importance of phosphates has received a lot of emphasis.

In fact, phosphate revenues average about the same as those for tourism and are only one-fourth as large those from agricultural production. Since 1974, Morocco has attempted to capitalize on its export strength to control phosphate prices. However, the kingdom failed to account for a number of external factors in its attempt to establish a sort of one-country "phosphate OPEC." Although its efforts were largely responsible for a temporary increase in price from \$14 a ton to \$68 a ton, that price increase also attracted new sources of phosphate rock and new competition into the market. As a result, over-production and price-competition exacerbated the depressing effect of the global recession on the world phosphate market. [Ref. 49: pp. 27-8.]

By 1983, the value of phosphate rock exports had decreased from a 1980 value of \$792 million to only \$459 million [Ref. 78: p. 2.] Morocco's structural position forces it to rely on export revenues to pay for the imports needed to broaden its economy's base. Unfortunately, phosphates have failed to produce these revenues, joining the growing list of reasons that explain why development has

been postponed and Morocco's growing population has had to focus on survival rather than growth.

d. Population

At the current rate of population growth, even mere survival may be an optimistic goal. The population, which stood at 15.4 million in 1972, was estimated at 24 million in mid-1984. At the present growth rate of 2.8 percent, the population will exceed 36 million by 2000. In contrast, agriculture grew at a rate of only 0.8 percent in 1970-80 and, of course, has declined in this decade due to the extended drought. [Ref. 86: p. 24, p. 54]

The 1982 census confirmed the extent of the massive urban migration. For example, the population of Casablanca experienced an increase of 3.3 million in only 11 years [Ref. 77: p. 503]. The growth of Morocco's crowded cities (from 14 to 44 percent of the population since 1956) created pressure on all public services. The exploding urban population has also created a tremendous requirement for jobs which Morocco's stagnant economy simply can not fill. Hassan for a time was able to use government employment as a disguised form of urban relief to keep the expanding urban population from rebelling [Ref. 18: p. 246]. However, debt-induced austerity measures, as previously discussed, forced an end to this practice.

The consequences of extreme population growth fall into two categories and are uniformly bad. The first group of consequences includes those that adversely affect economic development, political stability and human rights within developing countries. In the second category, out-of-control population growth rates tend to perpetuate inequities between rich and poor at all levels within the international system. Specific consequences are rising unemployment rates, expanding urban populations, pressure on food supplies and an increase in the number of "absolute poor." [Ref. 87: p. 1115]

Each of the aforementioned consequences afflict the Moroccan economy to varying degrees. The growing gap between the rich and poor may have the greatest potential for stimulating opposition to the crown in Morocco. As long as 10 percent of the population continues to absorb 45 percent of the nation's wealth, Morocco will continue to be heading, in King Hassan's own words, "...for a society where the poor will be very poor and the rich will be very rich." [Ref. 56: p. 83]

To reduce the growing socio-economic disparity between the classes in healthy economic conditions would be a tall order. To merely manage the socio-economic discontent created by the inherent inequalities of King Hassan's system may be impossible under the current conditions. One means of response still available to the regime, as its

response to last January's food riots demonstrated, is increased repression.

After 1984's "troubles", those concerned about the future of the monarchy in Morocco could not help but unhappily speculate about the long term results of the pattern of unrest, conflict, coercion and repression which seemed to be developing there.

Growth in GNP, diminished inflation, and fewer strikes may be achieved but at a huge cost in terms of repression, income redistribution, elimination of national entrepreneurship, increased poverty of the urban and rural sectors, and alienation of intellectuals and students. [Ref. 88: p. 470]

The riots were taken by some observers as strong indicators that material problems of existence may be of greater concern to the majority of Moroccans than the Sahara War which has been diverting much needed resources away from society [Ref. 89: p. 5].

B. IMPACT OF THE DESERT WAR

It would be difficult to overstate the effect of the tremendous expense of the war on other sectors of the economy. From the very beginning, the costs of this conflict have outweighed any conceivable material gains. When the campaign for the Western Sahara began in 1975, Morocco had only 61,000 men under arms and a military budget of \$190 million [Ref. 90: p. 418]. By 1984, the strength of

the armed forces had doubled to 125,000, and the military budget had expanded by a factor of greater than seven to \$1.4 billion [Ref. 91: p. 37]. At an estimated \$1 to 2 million a day, the war is bleeding Morocco white. A private estimate by the Banque du Maroc, which has been confirmed by diplomatic sources, places the true cost of the war at 50 percent of Morocco's GDP. [Ref. 80: p. 217] In addition, the war has isolated Morocco from other African states and is regarded with distaste by her Western allies.

Why then, given these considerations, has King Hassan become so committed to this war? John Damis, in Conflict in Northwest Africa [Ref. 49], answers this question with an evenhanded analysis of the internal, regional and international explanations for Morocco's involvement in the Sahara. For the purposes of this study, however, we will limit our attention to factors which explain Hassan's Saharan stance in terms of domestic politics and regime stability. Domestic political factors provide the key to understanding why, as even Hassan's critics admit, precipitate withdrawal from the Sahara campaign would probably cost the king not only his throne but his life. [Ref. 92: p. 295].

1. Complex Causes

The complicated factors that led Hassan to bring Morocco into the war make it very difficult for him to withdraw.

If Morocco is independent, it is not completely unified. The Moroccans will continue the struggle until Tangier, the Sahara from Tindouf to Colomb-Bechar, Touat, Kenadzn, Mauritania are liberated and unified. Our independence will only be complete with the Sahara! The frontiers of Morocco end in the south at St. Louis-du-Senegal! -- Allal el-Fassi, June 19, 1956 [Ref. 67: p. 85]

At first, these extravagant proposals surprised most Moroccans, but in the heady aftermath of independence, this idealized version of Morocco's borders captured the hearts of Moroccan nationalists. The Istiqlal party formally endorsed these territorial claims at its first post-independence conference in 1956. [Ref. 67: p. 87] In the years following independence, the concept of a "Greater Morocco", corresponding to the areas controlled by the Almoravid dynasty of the 11th and 12th century, eventually had to be reconciled with the realities of the post-colonial borders of the newly independent states of Mauritania, Mali and Algeria. Nevertheless, Morocco's irredentist fervor remained strong, shifting its focus to the Spanish held lands of the Western Sahara.

The legitimacy of the Moroccan claims is based in part on its unique status as a sovereign nation prior to the colonial era. To almost every Moroccan, the tribal, ethnic and religious ties between the "siba" and the "makhsan", which are the basis of the claim, are self-evident and not subject to serious questioning. [Ref. 49: p. 15] Moroccans contend that European colonialism arbitrarily detached

people and land from the sultan's domain. These claims have some legitimacy. For instance, the French detached the Tindouf region of Algeria from Morocco in 1952 as a reaction to the Moroccan nationalist movement, attaching this region to its "metropolitan" colony. Morocco based its right to restore the lost Saharan territory on two arguments:

1. The fact that the Moroccan ruler's spiritual and temporal authority was unchallenged in the region.
2. The conviction that the process of decolonization should not be used to perpetuate the "geographic absurdities" inflicted by Europeans on sovereign nations. [Ref. 93: p. 213]

In terms of regime stability, the emotion generated by this irredentist issue had significant implications. The monarchy in the immediate post-independence era could not afford to lag behind the political parties with which it was competing in demonstrating its nationalist fervor. Moreover, since the very basis of the claims glorified the historic powers of the sultanate, Mohammed V saw that this issue could easily be used to boost royal prestige. Accordingly, the monarchy threw the full weight of the government behind the "Greater Morocco" cause. In March 1958, Mohammed V publically promised to

strive with all our power to recover our Sahara and everything which by the evidence of history and the will of the inhabitants belongs of right to our kingdom.
[Ref. 67: p. 88]

From that point on, the Sahara became for Moroccan nationalists a piece of sacred "terra irredenta." [Ref. 46: p. 109] The emotion attached to this issue leaves the monarchy little room for maneuver. Although neither Mohammed V or King Hassan originated Morocco's claims to the Western Sahara, the issue has become identified with the fundamental tenets of Moroccan nationalism and has made the monarchy its prisoner. Hassan, as a result, finds himself in the delicate position of having to restrain various elements of the FAR and the Moroccan polity who still espouse the most extreme irredentist claims to a "Greater Morocco." John Damis likens Hassan's position to that of a man forced to ride a tiger in the midst of a war he cannot afford to lose. [Ref. 94: p. 174]

Since 1975, Morocco's armed forces have been fighting a bloody but relatively unpublicized guerilla war to assert sovereignty over the former Spanish colony of "Rio de Oro", now known as the Western Sahara. Morocco's physical opposition has been the Polisario ("Frente Popular para la liberacion de Saguia el Hamra y Rio de Oro"), led by a highly dedicated cadre of Sahrawi nationalists committed to Saharan independence. Yet the Polisario has virtually no material resources of its own. The front has been entirely dependent upon external sources to provide the military equipment and economic means to continue to prosecute the war.

This support has come from either Algeria or Libya, both of whom rely on the Soviet bloc for approximately 90 percent of their arms [Ref. 67: p. 354.]. Libya's support for the Polisario, while significant, has been seasonal. Since well before the recent pact between King Hassan and Col. Qaddafi, there were no Libyan arms deliveries to the Polisario. By contrast Algerian support has been steadfast since the very onset of hostilities. Not only did they provide the Polisario with arms, but all Libyan arms transfers have transited Algerian territory and been completed under Algerian supervision. Most importantly, the Algerians continue to provide the Polisario Front with sanctuary and material support in the Tindouf region of Algeria.

For the preceding reasons, as well as others more deeply rooted in historical antagonisms, many observers believe the desert war camouflages the larger struggle for regional hegemony which is taking place between the region's major powers, Algeria and Morocco. Thus Algeria, through its public support of the principle of self-determination, has been able to wage a costly proxy war against its number one regional rival, Morocco. [Ref. 49: p. 34]

In King Hassan's view, the enemy in the desert is not the Polisario; instead it is their Algerian patrons. He sees Algeria's goal as not the liberation of the Western Sahara but the overthrow of his monarchy. [Ref. 74: p. 23] King Hassan views his Saharan policy more as an attempt by a

regional power to preserve the status quo by fending off other regional rivals than as an expansionist assertion of dominance over a weaker nation [Ref. 95: p. 50-1]. To Hassan, the issue is one of national security. He has convinced most Moroccans that they are defending their country against an external threat. In that context, of course, policy options either do not exist or at best are quite limited. [Ref. 96: p. 32]

The rationale for this position is based on the Moroccan belief that the Polisario is purely a creation of its regional rival. According to the Moroccan version, the majority of the Polisario's fighting forces are not Sahrawis. These guerilla fighters, Moroccans claim, are mercenaries in the pay of the Algerians. They further contend that most of the "Sahrawi refugees" of the Tindouf are actually from Mali, Mauritania, Algeria and other drought-afflicted Sahelian countries. [Ref. 69: p. 14]

Morocco has yet to produce convincing evidence to substantiate these claims. Moreover, there is little doubt that the Polisario movement has as its core leadership a dedicated cadre of Sahrawi nationalists. Nonetheless, it is equally clear that the Polisario guerillas would be unable to sustain effective operations against Morocco were it not for the military, economic and basic needs support it receives from Algeria. It costs Algeria relatively little to provide the Polisario with a level of support sufficient

to keep Moroccan troops tied down in their defensive positions.

King Hassan has often said that "my Russia is Algeria." [Ref. 97: p. C1] Moroccans of all political stripes join the king in blaming Algeria for the ongoing conflict, arguing that Algerian support for self-determination is pragmatic, opportunistic and hypocritical. The Moroccan view of the conflict in the Western Sahara as a struggle against a rival state rather than as a struggle against a dedicated band of freedom fighters is a frequent theme of the national press as this excerpt from the pro-government Casablanca daily, Le Matin du Sahara, illustrates:

Everybody is perfectly aware of the fact that--aside from the intransigents in the Algerian regime--there is no liberation movement in the Sahara, that the whole affair is simply an aggression perpetrated by Algiers to seize part of our Saharan provinces in order to encircle Morocco and cut it off from Mauritania, which would form an easy prey for Algerian expansionism, and finally separate Morocco once and for all from black Africa. [Ref. 49: p. 24]

Moroccans may overstate their case by completely discounting ideological consistency as a motivation for Algeria's decision to support the Sahrawi rebels. Nevertheless, Moroccans are correct when they assert that there would be few signs of armed conflict today had Algeria elected to remain passive or neutral in the dispute.

2. Deceptive Effects

The complex network of internal, regional and international causes for the conflict in Northwest Africa has made it difficult to discern the relationship between cause and effect in the region. The nature of the fighting, the emotions generated by the cause and the pressures exerted by Morocco's other serious problems have forced King Hassan to operate in a generally reactive mode. He has found it difficult to adopt policies aimed at producing strategic advantages, forced by the pressures of the moment to settle for whatever, if any, tactical advantages are at hand. As a result, the impact of the desert war on the monarchy's stability has been deceptive. Its immediate impact has been positive--a restoration of the national consensus and the prestige of the monarchy. In the longer term, however, the costs of sustaining or eventually winning the struggle for the Sahara may turn Morocco's national consensus sour and even encourage radical political change.

a. Short-term benefits

We need a little victorious war to stem the tide of revolution. --V. K. Phleve, Russian Minister of the Interior, 1904. [Ref. 98: p76]

This oft-quoted statement represents the view that the argument which persuaded Russia to go to war with Japan in 1904, and persuades other countries to engage in

conflict today, was the desire to restore unity at home. The idea that internal politics leads to war has been indefatigable [Ref. 98: p. 77] This argument is heard frequently as an explanation for King Hassan's decision to commit Morocco to the war in the Western Sahara. Although it is arguable whether internal dissent was actually the crucial factor in the decision to launch the Sahara campaign, there is no question that internal unity has been one of the most significant dividends realized by King Hassan through Morocco's participation in the conflict.

In the aftermath of the military coup attempts, the seriousness of the problems facing the Moroccan monarchy had assumed crisis proportions. King Hassan was faced with paying the price for the "divide and rule" strategy he had employed to centralize power during the first decade of his reign. By weakening Morocco's political parties during his struggle for influence and control in the 1960s, Hassan found himself forced to depend almost exclusively on the army in the 1970s. [Ref. 50: p. 140] Unfortunately, from the standpoint of regime stability, the events of 1971 and 1972 indicated that the army could no longer be relied upon by the king for unquestioned support.

Domestically, the Moroccan political system in the early 1970s seemed to be wracked by permanent crisis. Students struck, elections were boycotted, thousands of political arrests were made and purges decimated the armed

forces [Ref. 67: p. 177]. The king's political isolation made it impossible for him to achieve consensus for any of his domestic policies. As previously discussed, it was at this point that Hassan initiated limited but significant reforms, realizing that further repression would not end the crisis.

Of all the initiatives designed to achieve unity and generate support for the throne, none was so effective as the Saharan "crusade." Despite the rather ironic fact that this issue was forced on Hassan, he was quick to understand and capitalize on its potential power for rebuilding a national consensus supporting his crown. Moroccans responded to the king's calls for liberation and integration of the Sahara with enormous enthusiasm. Media coverage of the "Green March" and subsequent events embellished the monarch's role as a symbol of unity and guarantor of defense. Hassan's call to arms also achieved two immediate results which impacted positively on the stability of his regime.

1. The "crusade" coopted and neutralized the opposition political parties thereby eliminating the most articulate of Morocco's domestic dissenters.
2. The Saharan campaign provided a noble cause to occupy the minds of FAR officers and a fight to occupy their troops--both at a safe distance from the king's palaces. [Ref. 67: p. 179]

In immediate terms, the war in the desert has strengthened the regime of King Hassan. The war has

bestowed upon Hassan, who was once considered to lack charisma, something approaching the nationalistic mystique of his father. Portraits of Mohammed V, which are always labeled "the liberator", are invariably accompanied by portraits of Hassan labeled "the unifier." The war has also served to divert the attention of the masses from the economic crisis which has been exacerbated in Morocco by such man-made causes as mis-management and corruption. Finally, with over half the FAR deployed in the desert, the war has also reduced to some extent the threat of a military takeover. [Ref. 99: p. A25]

By 1984, it was beginning to appear possible that Morocco might prove the experts wrong and prevail in this "unwinnable" war. King Hassan's "sand wall" strategy has been aimed at consolidating Morocco's military position in hopes that the Polisario and their supporters will eventually tire of this expensive stalemate.⁹ There is some evidence that this strategy is working. Libya stopped supplying arms to the Polisario in 1983. Algeria has displayed increasing moderation in the international arena. (The Saharan cause has never had much popular appeal there

⁹In 1980, the FAR began building a sand wall or "berm", encircling the phosphate-producing "useful triangle" area (approximately one-fifth) of the Western Sahara. Heavily fortified, manned by some 80,000 troops and augmented by the latest in electronic technology, the "berm" has enabled the FAR to hold the Polisario's guerilla fighters at bay and exclude them from the useful triangle

anyway.) If external support for the Polisario were to dry up, the rebels would be forced to re-evaluate their slogan, "The whole country or martyrdom." [Ref. 100: p. A67] Under those conditions it's possible that an arrangement could be found that would combine some degree of autonomy with official Moroccan sovereignty and provide both sides with an honorable way out. [Ref. 46: p. 124]

That sort of solution to the conflict would immediately remove the war as a factor which compounds Morocco's economic crisis. It would also excise the sense of common cause which has been a stabilizing factor for the regime for the last ten years. It would not, however, eliminate the chronic economic, social and political strains which the king's Saharan "crusade" has been able to effectively mask over the same period.

b. Long-term Dangers

As far as Morocco is concerned, the question of the Western Sahara has already been answered. There is no need whatsoever from a domestic political point of view for the king to hold a referendum. For Moroccans, it would be the equivalent of holding a referendum to decide the future of Florida. What's the point? --An American diplomat in Rabat [Ref. 96: p. 35]

The Moroccan frame of mind on this issue is largely responsible for the lack of progress toward a diplomatic settlement. In addition, there is nothing on the military front likely to decrease Moroccan intransigence

toward the question of referendum or negotiation with the Polisario. Even if the Moroccan attitude were to soften, it is hard to conceive of a diplomatic strategy that would be as effective as the sand wall strategy has been on the Saharan front. [Ref. 96: p. 35] However, Morocco's improved military position also increases the vulnerability of the king and suggest future problems for the conduct of the war.

One of the factors explaining the FAR's poor performance against the Polisario's guerillas in the early years of the desert war was an overcentralized command and control system. King Hassan had dispersed military units in 1972 and insisted that all military communications be filtered through Rabat as a preventive measure against further coup attempts. [Ref. 92: p. 302] However, the revised military tactics, which have turned the battlefield picture around, required greater command integration and decentralization of control over weaponry, ammunition and tactical decisions. This freedom to operate enabled military commanders to neutralize the Polisario's "rat patrol" guerilla tactics, but it also made military action against the throne feasible once again. It's possible that malcontents in the officer corps have already tried to move on the palace. The mysterious 1983 death of General Dlimi, the Moroccan Chief of Staff, gave birth to rumors that his death came as a result of his involvement in a plot against the king. [Ref. 55: p. B10]

Three longer term considerations should be weighed when evaluating the advantages Morocco currently seems to enjoy on the Saharan front. First, despite the apparent decrease of external support for the Polisario, military experts agree that the Sahrawi rebels require only a low level of support to keep Morocco's troops tied down in their defensive positions on the berm. Given the relatively insignificant cost for Algeria of continuing to promote Saharan self-determination, it seems unlikely that Algeria would abandon this cause, so closely linked to a fundamental principle of Algerian ideology. [Ref. 89: p. 5]

Secondly, the success of the sand wall strategy and the impact of the Treaty of Oujda (the Moroccan-Libyan "pact of African unity", signed in August 1984) had the effect of hardening the Algerian attitude. The perception of a threat to its own security could tempt Algeria to escalate its support for the Sahrawi rebels by providing them with the sophisticated weapons needed to overcome the Moroccan berm's lethal, high technology defenses. Each escalation of the conflict increases both the risk that the desert war will spill over other international borders and the possibility of direct conflict between Moroccan and Algerian troops. [Ref. 101: pp. 28-31]

Finally, there are practical limits to how far the sand wall strategy can be carried, no matter how successful it has been. There are already over 100,000

Moroccan troops in the region with 80,000 tied up on the berm alone, yet the Polisario are still free to roam over almost 80 percent of the territory. The idea of building longer and more distant sand walls has become increasingly impractical simply because of its prohibitive expense.

Perhaps the greatest long-term danger of the war is the unrealistic expectations it has raised for the peace. There are occasional "stargazing" comments overheard in Morocco, reminiscent of Egypt immediately after the Camp David accords, about how much better life will be when the war is over. Yet it is wishful thinking to believe that peace will bring an end to Morocco's problems. [Ref. 3: p. 33]

Although war-related costs have aggravated economic problems, the root causes of those problems--drought, the global recession, fallen phosphate prices and an exploding population--are independent of expenses related to the Saharan conflict [Ref. 94: p. 177]. The January 1984 riots showed how distressed the Moroccan citizenry has become over the necessity for economic sacrifice. The Saharan campaign, which bought Hassan a 10-year hiatus from the "king's dilemma", may not divert the masses much longer, whether the war continues to consume Morocco's vitally needed resources or ends in victory.

VI. FOREIGN DEPENDENCE

The desert war has generated military requirements which have forced King Hassan to seek a closer military relationship with the West. To the extent that Western military assistance is perceived by his people as dependence on the West, it undermines the legitimacy of Hassan's claims to represent Moroccan independence and Arab nationalism for the reasons discussed in Chapter II. In this chapter, we will discuss the nature of Morocco's dependence on foreign powers, the extent of U.S. penetration in Morocco and the impact of that penetration on the stability of the monarchy. Although the focus of this chapter is on current conditions in Morocco, the first point which must be emphasized is the relatively benign impact Morocco's unique colonial experience has had on its national psyche.

A. NATURE OF MOROCCO'S DEPENDENCY

In our protectorate, we do not regard or treat the natives as an inferior race, merely as another race.
--Marshall Lyautey, Resident General of Morocco, 1917.
[Ref. 102: p. 88]

Partly for self-imposed reasons and partly due to geography, Morocco spent several centuries isolated from the rest of the Arab world. When the country finally came under French and Spanish rule at the beginning of the 20th

century, its long history as a sovereign nation encouraged the colonial powers to attempt to accommodate their rule to Morocco's traditional Arab-Islamic culture. [Ref. 103: p. 482] In this respect, Morocco's experience was unique, not only in the Middle East, but also in North Africa.

When the French occupied Algeria in 1830, there were only three accepted methods of dealing with native cultures: extinction, expulsion and repression. [Ref. 102: p. 9] France chose the latter as its Algerian policy, the legacy of which was the savage war of independence fought 125 years later by the embittered descendants of generations of the oppressed. In Morocco, the case was entirely different. Although the country was still subdued by force of arms, the protectorate was characterized by a degree of sensitivity, tact and fairness toward the native population heretofore unprecedented in colonial administration. This is by no means to say that native Moroccans were contented with French rule or would have gladly shed blood to defend it (although significant numbers served under French colors in both Wars), only that by the standards of the day, French rule in Morocco was relatively enlightened.

Out of consideration for the pride of the Moroccan people, the French took pains to maintain the fiction that Morocco was a sovereign state, referring to it at all times as the "Sheriffian Empire", and requiring the concurrence of the sultan in the laws proposed by the French resident

general. France was careful not to denigrate the prestige of the sultanate by continuing to surround the sultan in the pomp and circumstance which the people of the time expected of their rulers. The administrative policy was one of control rather than command, direction instead of repression, and a velvet glove rather than an iron fist. [Ref. 104: pp. 361-2]

As we noted in Chapter II, writers like Fanon and Memmi concerned themselves with the possibility of whether the formerly colonized would ever be able to integrate their native heritage with the legacy of their colonial past. In the Iranian case, the system of indirect colonialism fed already prevalent xenophobic tendencies which are prominent among the factors which explain that society's rejection of the West. In Morocco, Marshall Lyautey's plan was to preserve as much autonomy and native culture as possible. The relatively sympathetic treatment of the protectorate at the hands of the French made the reconciliation of Eastern and Western cultures easier in Morocco. [Ref. 105: pp. 3-12] As a result, Morocco's nationalism was relatively free of the xenophobia which had characterized other nationalist movements in the Middle East. Mohammed V actually spoke of Morocco as a "trait d' union"--a bridge between the East and the West. [Ref. bla: pp. 135-6]

Despite the fact that Lyautey's successors reverted to more conventional colonial policies, cultural assimilation

was never pursued with the same vigor in Morocco as in other parts of the French Empire. One result was that the post-independence Moroccan was less likely to be tormented by the question of whether to identify with the European or his own culture. In other words, Morocco emerged from its colonial era with its sense of national identity intact.

Compared to the psychological scars carried by most newly independent nations, Morocco currently possess a healthy and secure self-image. Moroccan leaders find it easier to make decisions on how to modernize their country, revitalize their culture or interact with the center nations of the Western world on a purely pragmatic rather than emotional basis. The most significant constraints created by Moroccan dependence on the center tend to be material and economic rather than psychological.

Material dependence can be particularly acute when, as in Morocco's case, a country wishes to modernize rapidly and is heavily dependent on commodity exports to provide foreign exchange for development [Ref. 95: p. 8]. When the bottom fell out of the world phosphate market in 1980, Morocco became more reliant than ever on the largess of its foreign benefactors and international financial organizations. The impact of the country's inability to steer its own course was quickly felt.

As previously discussed, IMF dictated austerity measures forced Morocco to cut back on non-essential imports and food

subsidies, and to postpone its Five Year Development Plan. Although these IMF conditions were intended to restore balance to the economy, their burden fell on the shoulders of those least able to bear them. The apparent results of the IMF's attempts to promote financial rigor were the 1981 and 1984 food riots (known in Morocco as the "troubles"). Yet Morocco's position in the international economic system has left it little alternative other than to accept the measures its creditors and benefactors dictated. In fact, the critical and immediate nature of Morocco's economic and security problems has compelled it to accept expertise, trade, capital and security assistance on whatever terms are offered.

In Morocco, such processes as the demands of the international lending institutions and world commerce in arms and military training have particular relevance. From the viewpoint of dependency theorists, the problem is that these processes create a degree of penetration by external powers that leads to extreme economic and socio-political distortions. These in turn result in societal unrest similar to that which has so recently occurred in Morocco. The resultant "spiral of conflict and coercion" continues until the regime either cracks down or is replaced by one that will.

[Ref. 88: p. 470]

The recent "troubles" in Morocco indicate that the kingdom may be dangerously close to just such a situation.

Thus dependency, as it relates to the stability of the Moroccan monarchy, stands as still another factor which magnifies the effects of the "king's dilemma." Morocco's emerging elites, already somewhat disaffected by the gap between their aspirations and the opportunities available to them, are becoming further estranged from the present system by its apparent institutionalization of inequality via center to center dependency.

Although the renewed level of American interest in Morocco has received a lot of public attention, the French still completely dominate the center of Moroccan society in terms of presence, trade and cultural influence. Even though the pre-independence presence of over 300,000 Frenchmen has shrunk to only 50,000, the French foreign community is still the largest in Morocco. With an official presence of over 8000, Frenchmen form trained cadres at almost every level of commerce, science and education. In comparison, the American presence of just over 300, including the Peace Corps, is miniscule. [Ref. 46: p. 132]

The volume of trade between Morocco and France is three to four times greater than Morocco's trade with the United States or any of its other European trading partners [Ref. 106: p. 278]. The 450,000 Moroccans who live and work in France reinforce Morocco's French connection and help decrease Morocco's negative trade balance. Since 1980, worker remittances from France have averaged almost \$1

billion annually. This amount is almost equivalent to the combined contributions of phosphates, farm exports and tourism to external accounts. [Ref. 78: p. 2.]

Neither does America compete with the French cultural connection. For example, there are 25,000 Moroccans in French schools compared to only 350 enrolled in the United States. Most importantly, French is still the preeminent language of technical and commercial intercourse and will remain so for the foreseeable future. Ironically, despite such indications of the overwhelming impact of "Francophonie" on Moroccan life, and despite the obvious ascendancy of French stakes in Morocco, there remains some question as to whether Moroccans perceive France as the most important external power in the region. [Ref. 46: p. 135]

French rapprochement with Algeria following the election of Francois Mitterand seriously strained its ties with Morocco. In 1982, France announced the suspension of deliveries of arms and spare parts to Morocco until the question of Morocco's delinquency in payments was resolved. Rabat read this as a sign of the Socialist government's tilt toward Algeria in the Western Sahara conflict. Although French arms deliveries have since resumed, the incident caused Morocco to question French reliability as an arms supplier. [Ref. 107: p. 27] As a result, Moroccan arms purchases from the U.S. have increased considerably. For example, in the last three years, the U.S. has supplied over \$250 million in arms to Morocco [Ref. 108: pp. 3].

Such developments are perhaps what prompted former U.S. Ambassador to Morocco Richard Parker to note that "American officials on the scene are convinced that the United States is the number one foreign power in Morocco, while the French think they are number one." [Ref. 46: p.135] Officials of the Reagan administration have been particularly visible in attempting to reinforce this perception of a new American commitment to Morocco. A logical starting point for tracing the evolution of this new American commitment to Morocco is World War II.

B. THE AMERICAN CONNECTION

1. World War II to the Western Sahara

During World War II, the U.S.-Moroccan relationship was influenced by the conflict between American interests in dealing with the wartime French administration and American ideals regarding self-determination. The contradictory signals sent by President Roosevelt at the Casablanca Conference of 1943 illustrate the uncertain nature of America's commitment to self-determination for colonial people. On one hand, F.D.R. insisted on privately meeting with Sultan Mohammed V over the objections of French authorities. That meeting strengthened the sultan's belief that the United States would support Moroccan demands for full independence from France after the war. On the other hand,

the reality of F.D.R.'s actions did not support the nationalist's hopes, as he consistently spoke of full restoration of France to the administration of her colonies. [Ref. 109: pp. 133-5]

Following the war, U.S. diplomacy again took a back seat to that of France in the region. U.S. diplomats expressed the opinion that the people of Morocco would best advance under French tutelage. At the same time, they tried to influence the French to implement policies which would lead to the gradual evolution of the Moroccan people toward self-government as they became increasingly capable of managing their own affairs. This middle of the road approach seemed the only way to balance the U.S. interest in the political stability of the area with its interest in insuring the continued good will of both France and Morocco. [Ref. 110: pp. 687-98]

When it became apparent that the middle of the road stance was unpopular on both sides, the pressures of the cold war and the NATO alliance caused America to line up more solidly behind France [Ref. 111: p. 128]. Yet despite the irritation and disillusionment caused by U.S. unwillingness to support North African nationalism, Moroccan nationalists persisted in their faith in the basic anti-colonial goodwill of the United States [Ref. 111: pp 177-8]. For example, during the height of anti-French terrorism in Morocco in 1954, the nationalists stationed a soldier in

front of every American house to guard it against any inadvertent violence [Ref. 10: p. 189].

After Morocco's independence, the evolution of the bloody civil war in Algeria led to the deployment of 400,000 French soldiers to Algeria, substantially weakening NATO's continental strength. The resultant concern this raised for the alliance's security caused a number of leading Americans, including John F. Kennedy, to oppose French colonial policy in North Africa, reemphasizing America's missionary role as a champion of freedom in the world.

I am concerned that we are failing to meet the challenge of imperialism....It has repeatedly been appealed for discussion before the United Nations, wherever equivocal frameworks and opposition to its consideration have deemed our leadership and prestige in that body....It has affected our standing in the eyes of the free world, our prestige and our security....No, Algeria is no longer a problem for the French alone nor will it ever be again. [Ref. 109: p. 118]

This speech, which was delivered in July 1957, stands as a watershed event in U.S.-North African relations, but not because it was followed by any immediate or substantive policy change. Its primary importance was symbolic as it reinforced in Moroccan eyes the identification of America with the ideals FDR had earlier expressed in the Atlantic Charter and the "Four Freedoms."

Since that time, the U.S., while never directly challenging France's traditional economic primacy in the kingdom, has gradually increased its own political and

military support for the Moroccan regime. When relations between Paris and Rabat were temporarily ruptured in 1965 over the Ben Barka affair,¹⁰ the U.S. took advantage of the opportunity to develop more significant political ties. [Ref. 49: p. 119] The most significant growth area in U.S.-Moroccan relations, however has been military.

In 1974, the Ford administration sent a military mission to Morocco to assess the ability of the kingdom's armed forces to defend the country in the event of a war with Algeria. The mission recommended an extensive modernization and rearmament program for the Royal Armed Forces. [Ref. 49: p. 122] Under the plan, foreign military sales (FMS) agreements with the U.S. rose from only \$8.2 million in FY 1974 to \$242 million in FY 1975 [Ref. 67: p. 356]. The Ford administration continued its military support for King Hassan's regime even though it became almost immediately apparent that the regime's motives for rearmament were more related to irredentist claims in the Western Sahara than self defense. [Ref. 112: p. A13]

¹⁰ Mehdi Ben Barka, a founder member of the Istiqlal, was sentenced to death "in absentia" for his alleged involvement in a plot against the king. He disappeared in Paris in 1965, presumably assassinated at the orders of Hassan's Chief of Staff, General Oufkir. The manner of his assassination provoked a major rupture in relations between Rabat and Paris that continued until 1972.

2. The U.S. and the Desert War

The different world view held by the Carter administration, at least during its first three years in office, caused it to scale back U.S. military support for King Hassan's regime. The foreign policy approach taken by President Carter's administration has been characterized as "regionalist." Initially, the Carter team saw the world's problems as essentially the manifestations of such issues as underdevelopment and local disputes. They tended to look for regional answers to what they saw as regional problems.

Arms sales were of secondary importance from this perspective, often seen as a policy instrument which served only to exacerbate regional tensions. [Ref. 113: pp. 360-1] When the administration learned that Morocco, in violation of the U.S. Arms Export Control Act and a U.S.-Moroccan agreement signed in 1960, was employing U.S. weapons in the Sahara for uses unrelated to internal security or self defense, it enacted restrictions on the sale of further offensive weapons to Morocco [Ref. 49: p. 122].

The administration's restrictions on arms sales, as well as its regional perspective, were soon overcome by the pressure of global events. The overthrow of Somoza, the fall of the shah, the hostage crisis and the invasion of Afghanistan led to a more "conservative" interpretation of the nature of the world's problems. In Kissinger's view,

Carter's weakness had transformed "inchoate unrest into a revolution." The shah hesitated to take decisive action, Kissinger explained, because:

He must have had doubts about our real intentions. Whether we like it or not, the shah was considered our close ally in that area for 37 years. He left office under the visible urging of the United States. Other local leaders might fear similar treatment by America and would seek alliances elsewhere. [Ref. 114: p 371]

The Carter administration, shaken by this string of foreign policy disasters and apparently sharing some of Kissinger's fears, felt compelled to reinforce its support for valued friends in the Third World. In addition, it adjusted its strategic thinking by placing greater emphasis on the East-West dimensions of problems in the Middle East and North Africa. Finally, it abandoned the regionalist approach to security problems that had been introduced with the Nixon Doctrine. Thus, the ability to project American forces into the region began to play an important role in American military planning. [Ref. 114: pp. 371-3]

One other factor entered into the Carter administration's calculations regarding U.S.-Moroccan military relations. By 1979, the tactical situation in the desert war had become rather bleak. It seemed possible that Morocco might have to withdraw its irredentist claims to the Western Sahara. Furthermore, there were reports of Polisario incursions into Moroccan territory. It was widely agreed that

that defeat or precipitate withdrawal would cost Hassan his crown if not his life. Thus, in the context of imminent disaster to the Moroccan monarch, as well as the previously cited global events, the Carter administration approved a \$235 million sale of OV-10s, F-5Es and Hughes helicopter gunships to Morocco, despite their obvious offensive, counterinsurgency utility. [Ref. 115: p. 133]

Following the renewal of offensive arms shipments to Morocco, the Polisario realized only one significant military success, the attack on the Moroccan garrison at Guelta Zemmour in October of 1981. In the course of this battle, the Polisario downed five Moroccan aircraft, some by Soviet Sam 6 missiles. [Ref. 49: p. 99]

By the end of 1981, the battlefield crisis had subsided. As has been previously discussed, greater decentralization of Moroccan command and control probably had as much to do with Morocco's battlefield success as American equipment. Nonetheless, 1981 marked a clear turning point, both quantitatively and qualitatively, in U.S.-Moroccan military relations. The arms transactions approved by the Carter administration certainly had a significant tactical impact. If nothing else, the American supplied OV-10s, Huey gunships, cluster bombs and electronic detection devices blunted the effectiveness of the Polisario's hit and run "rat patrol" tactics. Even more significant, however, was the qualitative shift, begun in the waning days of the

Carter administration and enthusiastically continued by the Reagan administration, to a "globalist" foreign policy.

The Reagan administration rejected the view that changes in the international system over the last twenty-five years had limited U.S. ability to shape regional events. It saw the string of unfavorable global events that occurred during the Carter administration as consequences of America's failure to assert its power. The basic element of the Reagan foreign policy is a distinctly bi-polar world-view, emphasizing "the Soviet Union, its military buildup and its 'misbehavior' in the developing world." [Ref. 116: p. 44] Arms sales have been given a much higher priority in the competition with the Soviet Union. This has been especially evident in North Africa.

One of the administration's first acts was the approval of the sale of 108 M-60 tanks to Morocco, sending a clear signal that the days of the arms transaction as an "exceptional instrument of foreign policy" were ended. It was in the same spirit that the administration removed the limitation that transfers to Morocco be contingent upon continued Moroccan progress toward a negotiated settlement of the Western Sahara issue. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Morris Draper, in testimony before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, declared:

America's allies and close associates should expect understanding and reliable support. It would not be in the spirit of the administration's policies if support

for America's traditional and historic friends--to meet reasonable and legitimate needs--were to be withheld or made conditional other than under extraordinary circumstances....the administration feels strongly that traditional old friends such as Morocco deserve special understanding. [Ref. 117: p. 5, p. 14]

The recently departed American Ambassador to Morocco, Joseph Reed, was an unabashed 4th of July salesman for America--wryly dubbed by sophisticated Moroccans as "Mister America." [Ref. 74: p. 25] An open admirer of King Hassan, Reed enjoyed easy access to the king and was the only envoy allowed to fly around the kingdom in his own government's airplane [Ref. 73: p. 44]. The ambassador succinctly summarized the impact of Reagan policy on his approach to U.S.-Moroccan relations.

Morocco sits at the strategic straights of the Mediterranean. It is clear how Morocco is important to the survivability of Europe. My mandate is to move ahead with the Reagan Plan for Morocco. My mandate is to illustrate to our friends around the globe that the Reagan administration wanted to single out Morocco as the primary example of how America supported a proven ally and friend. [Ref. 118: p. A3]

His enthusiasm reflects that felt by the Reagan administration for King Hassan. Hassan probably shares President Reagan's views on world politics to a greater degree than any other Arab leader. Like the president, the king believes that the Soviet Union poses the greatest threat to the region's security. Hassan also feels the Carter administration wavered in its support of its proven

friends. [Ref. 55: p. B18] Official U.S. rhetoric, during Ambassador Reed's tenure, unfailingly referred to the Soviet threat while emphasizing the depth of U.S. commitment to the king.

I keep saying to the Moroccans: 'Count on us. We are with you.' I believe we must keep our word. I really do believe the Soviet Union is the only remaining nineteenth century empire, and to me it is obvious that the next pressure point for the Soviets is going to be the Kingdom of Morocco, situated strategically as it is on the Straights of Gibraltar. [Ref. 74: p. 25]

Hassan provides the United States with a reliable Arab friend, a role once played by Egypt (which is currently under pressure to distance itself from the United States diplomatically). As previously discussed, Hassan's private channels of influence have been useful in the past to the United States and other Western powers. From Hassan's perspective, the U.S. provides:

1. The political support of a superpower for Morocco's efforts to gain international recognition of its annexation of the Western Sahara.
2. Military aid which has enabled the FAR to achieve at least stalemate in the desert war.
3. To a lesser extent, investment and financial aid to Morocco's stricken economy.

We have already noted that U.S. penetration has had its greatest impact in the area of military relations. The growing level of U.S. military aid, in the form of FMS credits, military assistance program (MAP) grants, and international military education and training (IMET)

appropriations, has altered the nature of what had been primarily a commercial relationship.¹¹ [Ref. 67: p. 357] To a large extent, congressional restraint and Moroccan financial difficulties have prevented even closer military ties. Nevertheless, Moroccan officials have made it clear that the Reagan administration's programs have a symbolic and psychological value that goes beyond their quantitative dimensions. Congressional analysts agree that the perceived increase in American military support for Morocco is viewed by Moroccans as the major new feature in U.S.-Moroccan bi-lateral relations. [Ref. 4: p. 10]

In May 1982, the U.S. and Morocco signed an agreement giving the U.S. access to Moroccan air bases during undefined regional emergencies. Because of Moroccan sensitivity to the idea of "American bases" on Moroccan soil, the exact nature of the "quid pro quos" has never been released, but one can safely assume that the obvious growth in military relations since 1982 is connected. [Ref. 119: p. A3] Earlier that year, the two countries had agreed to a U.S.-Moroccan joint military commission (JMC).

¹¹The Carter administration requested and received authority for \$150.7 million military grant/aid for Morocco. The Reagan administration, during its first term, won approval for \$242.3 million in FMS credits, MAP or IMET out of over \$300 million requested.

From the globalist perspective, that arrangement was seen as tantamount to a military alliance against Soviet and Libyan influence in the region. According to a Moroccan official, Morocco's goals in the JMC were to increase mutual understanding and to provide Moroccans with American know-how and training. "Someday," said the same official, "Morocco and the United States might have to fight together." He added that, "Morocco has a long way to go before it could envision joint exercises with F-16s." [Ref. 4: p. 9]

As long as the desert war continues, Morocco will require a steady supply of arms. Moreover, due to its current economic problems and structural state of dependence, Morocco will require concessionary terms to finance its military purchases. The Reagan administration has so far been willing to be Morocco's military patron. As the statements in the preceding paragraph imply, Moroccan expectations from its military relationship with the United States are high. The question that remains is to what extent both the perceptions and actual dimensions of Morocco's growing military dependence on the United States affect the stability of King Hassan in political, military and economic terms.

C. IMPACT OF MOROCCO'S MILITARY DEPENDENCE

1. America's Lethal Embrace

Hassan, who opened his palace to the shah during his exile and to members of the shah's family afterward, has had ample opportunity to observe firsthand the dangers of being perceived as a puppet of American interests. He has been sensitive to the political consequences of perceived overdependence since the first days of his reign. For example, public pressure was the most significant element in the Moroccan decision to force the U.S. to evacuate its Moroccan air bases in 1963. Much of Hassan's legitimacy has always been derived from the association of his crown with Moroccan independence. Thus, the king is somewhat of a prisoner to his own nationalist popularity whenever issues relating to foreign dependence arise. [Ref. 60: pp. 58-60] Yet the same force works to counteract perceptions of overdependence when the issue is the conflict in the Western Sahara.

Occasionally, reports surface that the desert war is "Hassan's war" and that popular support for the war within Morocco is ebbing. These reports are simply not true. As has been acknowledged, Hassan exploited the circumstances of this crisis to enhance his legitimacy in a number of ways. However, Hassan neither originated the issue of Moroccan claims to the Western Sahara nor has he been at the forefront of its champions. The timing of the Sahara campaign

was dictated by the Spanish decision to withdraw from Rio de Oro, not by the king's domestic problems. If Hassan had not moved in 1975, the FAR probably would have invaded the Sahara without him. Since that time, the war has been backed by a national consensus and broad public support. [Ref. 94: pp. 173-4]

During a recent congressional visit to Morocco, several members of congress discovered the extent to which support for the war spans the Moroccan political spectrum. At a meeting with government officials and opposition leaders, certain members of congress directed rather strident criticism of the regime's intransigence on Western Saharan issues toward their Moroccan hosts. Abderraihim Bouabid, one of Morocco's major opposition figures and the first secretary of the Popular Union of Socialist Forces (Morocco's Communist Party), declared that the congressional delegation was trying to blackmail the Moroccan government. Bouabid added, "if this is going to be your attitude, we regret it, deplore it, and we will turn elsewhere for the arms we need to defend ourselves." [Ref. 120: p. 64] One would have to conclude that the nationalist fervor generated by the Saharan campaign is likely to overrule any opposing political forces resulting from Morocco's military dependence on the United States.

At the most fundamental level, the U.S.-Moroccan military relationship has had a positive impact on short

term regime survivability. The arms transfers approved at the end of the Carter administration, and the additional assistance provided at the beginning of the Reagan administration (particularly following the debacle at Guelta Zemmour), came at critical junctures in the desert war. Although the war is not "Hassan's war", it was the king, who by so closely identifying his crown with the cause, elevated it to the level of "national crusade." Just as Hassan's choices were limited by nationalist fervor over the American bases issue in 1963, so is he the "apprentice of his own sorcery" regarding the Saharan "crusade" in 1985. After ten years of sacrifice, it would be unrealistic to expect Hassan to admit that the "crusade" had failed, that so many lives and so much treasure had been squandered. Yet from 1978 through 1981, that outcome seemed to be a distinct possibility.

If events had taken that course, it seems almost certain that the FAR would have not only blamed their defeat (with at least some justification) on the king but would have moved immediately to overthrow him. [Ref. 61: p. 5] Increased U.S. military aid averted both possibilities by improving Morocco's military capability to meet the Polisario threat.

Politically, U.S. assistance bolstered the regime of King Hassan by sending the message that America would once again stand by its friends in time of crisis. However, the

beneficial political effects of closer U.S.-Moroccan ties can be overstated. To the extent that the U.S.-Moroccan relationship is perceived to contradict the tenets of fundamentalist Islam, its potential for destabilizing the monarchy must also be considered. As discussed in Chapter II, resurgent fundamentalist Islam is rejecting such colonial era socio-political models and ideologies as secular nationalism, organized parties and military elites [Ref. 121: p. 24]. Its view of the West as corrupting its traditions further undercuts the legitimacy of modernizing, pro-Western leaders in the Islamic world [Ref. 71: p. 111].

French journalists report that members of the League of Islamic Youth, in cooperation with the Marxist-Leninist "Hal-Amam" movement, were among the leaders of last year's civil uprisings. Moroccan security forces seized leaflets alleged to have been distributed by these groups that claimed that Morocco's financial difficulties were due not so much to the war, nor the drought, but to the "plundering of our riches by Americans and enemies." They characterized the recent Islamic conference held in Casablanca as a "blind conspiracy manipulated by the two great Satans: America and the USSR." [Ref. 122: p. 8] Such sentiment is by no means widespread, at least not at the present. Nonetheless, its chilling similarity to the slogans that preceded the fall of the shah underscores the hazards posed by being perceived as "America's king."

The French have pointed out that they would prefer that America tone down its growing involvement in Morocco. Although French motives for making this point may be not entirely above suspicion, both the French and the United States share an overriding interest in the crown's stability. The French have warned against "explicit, overt demonstrations" of American friendship, perhaps fearing that an "American kiss of death" could have the same outcome for Hassan as it did for the shah. [Ref. 4: p. 6]

2. Moving Closer to the Brink

A clear problem suggested by the overwhelmingly military orientation of U.S. policy is that it almost completely ignores the political and economic ramifications of the Western Sahara issue. It can be argued that these internal forces pose an even more serious threat to Hassan's stability than does the war. Congressional critics of U.S. military support for Morocco fear that this assistance has enabled King Hassan to hold on rather than negotiate in the desert war.

From their point of view, the king's "sand wall" strategy is seen not as aimed at defeating the Polisario but merely achieving a military stalemate and wearing the guerillas and their supporters down. In the first place, these critics point out, the cost of the war (at least indirectly) exacerbates Morocco's adverse economic situation. In a sort

of "worst-case dependency" scenario, they fear that Morocco's continued economic deterioration, by creating the ideal breeding ground for the coalescence of the impoverished masses, disenchanted elites, "intelligentsia" and Islamic fundamentalists, could effectively mobilize the disparate forces calling for radical political change. [Ref. 120: p. 40.]

A related fear is that the symbolic and psychological dimensions of American support may have raised unrealistic expectations in the FAR. By giving Hassan's military leaders undue hope that the war is winnable, despite the unanimity of expert opinion that it is not, the U.S. may be helping to trap Hassan in the Saharan quagmire. The longer the war drags on without a military victory, the greater Hassan's vulnerability to military plots.¹² For example, the mysterious death of General Ahmed Dlimi, King Hassan's closest military and security advisor, bears the mark of a political assassination. A report which appeared in Le Monde connects Dlimi's death with reports of an attempted military coup by a group of officers led by him and impatient with the conduct of the war [Ref. 123: p. 183].

¹² Should Hassan fall to a military coup in circumstances similar to these, U.S. interests would be adversely impacted in two ways. First, the successor military regime would probably be hostile to the external powers most closely associated with the discredited ruler's policies. Secondly, the new military regime might feel compelled to escalate the level of military action to restore Morocco's honor on the battlefield.

The United States and France, which together supply virtually all of Morocco's arms, share some responsibility for Hassan's unwillingness to work more diligently for a long term solution to the Western Sahara problem. To the extent that U.S. support encourages Morocco to neglect its pressing domestic problems in pursuit of an illusory victory in the desert, it acts against both countries' interests. William Bundy suggests that nations need to weigh the relative importance of economic and military strength.

Arms races in many parts of the world represent a diversion to military purposes of enormous resources that might otherwise be used in the direction of progress. Is the military power these nations seek really useable even for the objectives envisaged? In seeking it, are they not sacrificing not only the welfare of their people but the roots of their economic strength--and are we and the other Western nations not assisting them in this wrong emphasis? [Ref. 124: p. 40]

For Morocco's Western supporters, this question is important; for her king it is critical.

Following recent reports of direct clashes between Moroccan and Algerian forces, the danger of a "real war" between the regional rivals looms ever more ominously. A head-on confrontation makes no sense for either side, but both sides are tempted to indulge in "brinksmanship." In such a situation, it's always possible that one side may go too far. [Ref. 125: p. 21] Internationalization of the conflict would lead to tragedy for both countries, raising the specter of superpower involvement as well as further

escalation. From that perspective, continued contributions to Morocco's growing arsenal would seem to threaten not only King Hassan's regime but the stability of the entire region.

The events we have summarized have shown that neither an exclusively regionalist nor a globalist approach to U.S.-Moroccan relations is likely to contribute to the stability of the Moroccan regime. During the 1979-1982 time frame, the "globalist", military-oriented nature of U.S. assistance may have been the most appropriate way to help Morocco weather a serious military crisis. In addition, the highly visible nature of U.S. support bolstered the regime by suggesting that if King Hassan were threatened, the United States would act more "forthrightly in his support than it did when the shah was being threatened." [Ref. 74: p. 25]

Since 1982, direct threats to Morocco's security have gradually subsided. A regional approach may now be the best way to advance U.S. interests in the Moroccan crown's survival. In the present environment, Morocco no longer finds it as necessary to suppress its desire to operate with some independence in the international system. As already discussed, the Morocco-Libya accord illustrates Moroccan resistance to attempts by the center to influence its foreign policy. Simultaneously, U.S. policy has begun to show more sensitivity to the war's heavy impact on Morocco's limited financial and human resources. For example,

military aid dropped in FY 1984 to only \$40 million, almost all which was spent on spare parts and maintenance for existing weapons systems. [Ref. 97: p. C1] Although the Reagan administration has yet to issue a definitive foreign policy statement on Northwest Africa, there is a growing realization that Hassan must end his unwillingness to conduct substantive negotiations with his opposition (the Sahrawis, the Polisario and Algeria). [Ref. 126: p. 15]

The U.S. position among Morocco's center nations is particularly ticklish. Since American penetration in Morocco is almost exclusively military, the U.S. has lacked much leverage with which to exercise influence once the battlefield crisis subsided. In addition, the intensely nationalistic nature of the desert war has tended to imprison Morocco's military patron in much the same way as it has imprisoned its king. Thus, the mere fact of dependency has been no guarantee that the center nation will be able to influence the policies of the peripheral country. U.S diplomacy's failure to move Hassan any closer to a negotiated settlement in the Sahara typifies the uncertain relationship between influence and dependency.

King Hassan's dependency is a condition that will persist for the foreseeable future. For center nations with a stake in the stability of the Moroccan monarchy, the challenge has been to provide Hassan with the assistance he needs without undermining his legitimacy or aggravating the

undesirable effects of dependency. For King Hassan, the challenge is to continue the difficult task of juggling the conflicting demands arising from the desert war, the stricken economy and his peoples' aspirations. In the meantime, Morocco's ruler must continue to find ways to buy time as he struggles with a seemingly endless war which he cannot afford to lose, but a war which many experts say he will never be able to win.

VII. CONCLUSION

A. THE KING VS. THE SHAH

King Hassan faces an array of intimidating problems. It is unclear how much longer he will be able to postpone his reckoning with the "king's dilemma." Even to those who are optimistic about the prospects of his regime, the parallels between certain features of Moroccan society and the societal ills which brought down Iran are troubling.

Both societies experienced a tremendous rural to urban exodus, accompanied by growing economic inequalities. Each country has had to deal with growing numbers of educated citizens whose aspirations exceeded available opportunities. Neither country achieved a level of political maturity in which authority was rationalized or structure differentiated. In fact, not only was structure undifferentiated, but there was almost no correlation between office, power and achievement in the bureaucracies of either country.

It would be hard to overstate the pervasiveness of corruption in official Moroccan or Iranian life. On the other hand, Islamic resurgence, with its emphasis on social justice, stands in stark contrast to the greed and secularism of both regimes and their elites. The most obvious

parallel of course is between the two autocratic despots themselves and the anachronistic institution of the monarchy.

Yet the situations are not identical. The list of differences exceeds in size those similarities just cited. The nature of some of the differences (ie., sources of legitimacy, role of Islam, leadership qualities) are especially significant. A category by category examination of these differences highlights a number of areas in which King Hassan and his regime enjoy relative strength.

1. Domestic Factors

King Hassan's natural legitimacy has much deeper roots than that of the shah. The Alawites are descended from the Prophet and ruled Morocco for over 300 years. The Pahlavi dynasty, in contrast, was an artificial creation. Few Iranians were deeply impressed by the shah's exaggerated pretensions of noble lineage. Furthermore, the shah was psychologically hampered by his former relationships with the colonial powers. For Hassan the "colonial legacy" reinforced the crown's link with the triumphal struggle for independence

In direct contrast to the situation in Iran, everything in the history of "colonial" Morocco worked to make the monarchy a major beneficiary of independence. The French protectorate overcame the ethnic, cultural and

political fragmentation that had existed in the "bilad al siba", completing the process of national unification for the sultanate. In addition, the colonial administration handed over a highly centralized bureaucracy with which the sultan could effectively exercise his sovereignty for the first time. Finally, Moroccans gained a sense of national purpose from their struggle for independence, the circumstances of which strengthened the crown's identity with Moroccan nationalism and values. Iran's colonial legacy was merely a "myth of independence" which was not able to sustain the country's sense of purpose when tested. Iran realized neither the benefits of colonial administration nor the unifying nationalist spirit which results from a successful struggle for independence.

Following the coup attempts of the early 1970s, there was pressure on King Hassan to emulate the shah's "White Revolution." However, the king sidestepped the problem of land reform by nationalizing the remaining foreign holdings instead. The king's land policies had the effect of retaining for him the support of the traditional landholders who in Iran became bitter opponents of the throne following the "White Revolution."

Unlike the shah, the king's land policies did not alienate the Islamic establishment, who remain an important source of the crown's legitimacy. There was no massive redistribution of power. Thus today, Hassan's power base

retains support from each of the traditional sources discussed in Chapter II, with his most significant constituency composed of both traditional and modern elites.¹³ Support for the shah, as already noted, had shrunk to just the military and portions of the elite classes in the months preceding the revolution.

The king and the shah had fundamentally opposite political philosophies. The shah once explained the harshness of his rule by saying, "When Iranians behave like Swedish citizens, I'll rule like the King of Sweden." [Ref. 24: p. 70] His almost contemptuous opinion of his people's political maturity runs counter to the more patronizing view held by Hassan. Hassan views Morocco's eight parties as "political schools" and uses them to actually enhance his control over dangerous elements in Moroccan society. By encouraging the formation of political "safety valves", Hassan keeps his opponents from engaging in more radical forms of opposition. In Iran, the lack of political outlets forced the discontented to the Mosques, facilitating the revolution.

¹³The landed aristocracy, merchant elite, clerical establishment, local notables, state bureaucracy, middle class, masses and foreign governments.

2. Islamic Factors

Islam neither occupies the same position in Moroccan society nor does it pose the same potential for political activism as it did in Iran. In general, Islam plays a role in Morocco that increases the stability of the crown and strengthens royal authority. In Iran, on the other hand, Shiism provides a much stronger doctrinal justification for opposition to temporal authority. The charge of the Shiite ulama is to perform the function of the "hidden Imam" in his absence. In Sunni jurisprudence, the ulama do not perform the function of the caliph, but assist the Muslim community in doing that which God wills. Since the Sunni do not make room for "ijtihad" (independent judgement) as do the Shia, they have been especially supportive of the Moroccan ruler whom they revere as both emir and imam. [Ref. 37: pp. 34-5]

In Iran, the Islamic establishment opposed modernization itself. Khomeini's views of modernizations' corrupting influence were so medieval as to make any accommodation between his brand of Shiism and the shah's regime unlikely. In Morocco, Islam is not in such fundamental conflict with modernity. Islam was a valuable weapon in the nationalist struggle and is still closely linked to national policy. Nonetheless, there are growing signs of Islamic unrest over the impact of secular modernization outside the religious establishment in Morocco.

In Morocco, the religious establishment is tied to the king by bonds of mutual interest. In Iran, the shah and Reza Shah before him had permanently alienated and embittered the mullahs. As previously mentioned, the king in his role as "Commander of the Faithful" derives considerable legitimacy from the Islamic establishment.

Taken together, these factors make it unlikely that the establishment clergy could ever play a role in a Moroccan revolution comparable to the dominant role played by the mullahs in Iran. On the other hand, working class religious groups, who are generally looked down upon by the Islamic establishment, have the potential for fanning resentment over the regime's apparent violations of the tenets of populist Sunni Islam.

It is possible that an alliance of army recruits and junior officers could be formed with the socially discontented among the brotherhoods, the slums, students and radicals. However a number of factors make it unlikely that such fragmented forces would ever be able to overwhelm the Moroccan middle class, bureaucracy and elite as did the disparate elements of Iranian society that rose against the shah.

1. The various orders and brotherhoods lack the infrastructure the Shia used to unite the diverse groups opposed to the shah.
2. Most of Morocco's institutions are basically conservative in character and would have much to lose under conditions of radicalized fundamentalism.

3. The military would be determined to prevent an overthrow of the king by anyone but itself.
4. The United States would probably take action to prevent the occurrence of "another Iran." [Ref. 70: p. H3]

3. Leadership Factors

Despite the devastating sense of loss experienced by Moroccans on the day of his father's death, the circumstances of the accession of King Hassan to the Moroccan throne placed him in a far better position to begin his rule than that occupied by the shah 20 years earlier. 31 year old Prince Moulay Hassan's education and his "hands on" experiences as crown prince had all been designed to prepare him for that day. Reza Shah's abdication, in contrast, found Mohammed Reza Pahlavi unprepared in terms of age, education or experience to assume royal responsibilities in Iran. It's not surprising, considering the vast differences in their preparation to rule, that the leadership styles of the two men vary considerably.

King Hassan's style closely resembles Crane Brinton's model of the type of determined leadership that makes successful revolutions unlikely. Hassan employs the "timely combination of repression and concession", recommended by Brinton, to deal with the destabilizing effects of modernizing change. He has masterfully manipulated Morocco's patrimonial system to control his opposition by

rewarding it when it cooperates with him and punishing it when it rebels. When repressive measures are called for, as following the coup attempts of the 1970s, Hassan has demonstrated the will to ruthlessly eliminate those he considers threats.

The shah's repressive measures, in contrast, were usually somewhat incomplete. He seemed to lack the stomach to take the drastic measures required to fully finish off his most serious opponents, as when he let Khomeni off the hook in 1963. The timing of his reforms was almost always wrong so that rather than working as rewards to coopt his opposition, they were seen as tactical concessions made under pressure. To the Iranian mind, this only served to reinforce the perception of the shah's weakness.

There seem, therefore, to be two differences between the leadership characteristics of the shah and the king. The first is the king's sense of when and how to apply the autocrat's classic techniques of repression and concession. To be sure, the Moroccan regime is as capable of brutal activity as any, but it nonetheless has a moderate reputation by Third World standards. The modernizing process itself inevitably causes change within traditional society and its manifestations are often destabilizing. King Hassan's use of the autocrat's classic tools proves that he understands that the problem is not merely how to prevent change, which can be done to some extent by repression, but

how to permit change within tolerable limits. This requires a more complex application of the range of resources at the ruler's command. [Ref. 46: p. 31]

The last, and most important distinction between the two rulers, is will. At the heart of the king's dilemma for the reforming monarch, is the question of how to share power without losing it. To control the chaos which seems to accompany development, rulers must sometimes exercise autocratic powers. The shah, despite his masquerade as a steel-willed autocrat, was in the end unprepared to exercise his power as ruthlessly as would have been required to insure his survival. Hassan has shown no similar lack of resolve.

4. Economic Factors

Hassan has taken a relatively measured, controlled approach to economic and social development. Perhaps the country's relative lack of export-generated wealth has been a blessing. We have already observed how the misguided, over-ambitious plans of the shah resulted in instability. With less money to spend, Morocco has avoided such grandiose sinkholes. The King's limited economic programs allow for some upward mobility, and his political system provides an opportunity for his opponents to "let off steam" rather than revolt. Whether the present political system will satisfy the next generation of emerging aspirant-elites is doubtful. The fact that current economic conditions will

not is certain. Nonetheless, King Hassan has amply demonstrated his ability to adapt his "balancing act" to changing conditions in the past.

The end of the global recession will alleviate some of Morocco's immediate economic problems. Nonetheless, it would be preposterous to consider the current economic situation, even in relative terms, a plus for King Hassan. Morocco's economic problems in one way or another contribute to almost all of its domestic instability. In addition, the Saharan war diverts both resources and attention from their solution. In the final analysis, even King Hassan has acknowledged that something must be done about the extremes of wealth and poverty in the country.

5. Foreign Dependence

There are only about 300 Americans, including the Peace Corps, on official status in Morocco today. Compared to the official French presence of over 8000, this is hardly a number to excite great interest. Moroccans are not particularly uncomfortable with or suspicious of foreigners in any case. This marks a clear difference between the Moroccan and Iranian psyche. Hassan is less likely than other Islamic leaders to be judged harshly by his own people for his foreign association because of Morocco's long history of European cultural orientation.

Moroccans simply do not share the xenophobic tendencies which seem to characterize their Eastern Arab and Persian brothers. This is certainly another point which works in King Hassan's favor. The political, social and economic ramifications of the enormous concentration of resources required by the desert war make him more dependent than ever on external economic and military assistance. Since the pace of Morocco's development has been so much slower than in Iran, economic assistance has not had the alienating effect of seeming to deny everything that is Moroccan. Since Moroccans associate military assistance with the sacred cause in the Sahara, military assistance has few negative connotations for the suppliers.

Even so, one of the lessons the U.S. learned in Iran was that being perceived as "America's King" poses a danger for friendly rulers. Thus, both Morocco and the U.S. have exercised considerable discretion in characterizing the extent of American involvement in Morocco (the dramatic statements of the most recent U.S. Ambassador of Morocco notwithstanding). Even the U.S. Congress has demonstrated its sensitivity to the delicacy of this issue by downplaying the policy debate over the U.S.-Moroccan relationship so as not to raise the dependency question and encourage Hassan's domestic opposition. [Ref. 43: p. 168]

It seems extremely unlikely that King Hassan would submit to an overly close embrace by the U.S., having had

firsthand knowledge of its impact on his friend, the Shah of Iran. From that perspective, the Treaty of Oujda stands as a particularly "imaginative act of diplomatic opportunism", serving several immediate purposes that have already been noted. In terms of dependency, the association with America's anathema, Qaddafi, makes it abundantly clear that King Hassan is first and foremost the guardian of Morocco's interests and can not be dictated to by America. [Ref. 127: p. 13]

B. ASSESSMENT

While a serious degree of development asymmetry exists in Morocco, the comparison with pre-revolutionary Iran has clearly demonstrated King Hassan's advantage over the shah in four of the five categories discussed. Morocco's economic plight, however, must be counted as a negative factor for King Hassan because of its short-term insolvency and because of the impact it has as a major cause of social discontent. In addition, the war-related, long-term threats to the throne, which the patriotic emotions of the war have hidden, are increasingly likely to materialize as it endlessly drags on. On the other hand, it's unlikely that the socially discontented could be effectively mobilized in opposition to King Hassan any time in the immediate future because of the broad basis of his legitimacy and domestic support.

The only group with the organization and infrastructure needed to overthrow the king and assume power in Morocco is the armed forces. As already noted, the king has, for the time being at least, won their solid loyalty. Thus, barring a cataclysmic event such as assassination, Hassan's reign appears to be secure. Although domestic opposition could conceivably coalesce in the future if nothing is done to alleviate economic inequalities, Hassan is not at the moment threatened by any indigenous uprising comparable to that which led to the fall of the shah. The longer term future for Morocco and its monarchy is less certain.

Morocco is blessed, by Middle East standards, with a number of material advantages. With its phosphate reserves, fertile agricultural lands, relative abundance of water, rich fishing grounds and other resources, Morocco has the potential for a broad-based economy, less dependent than other nations in the region on a single commodity. In terms of human resources, Moroccans are also perhaps better equipped to handle the confrontation with modernity. The country enjoys a long history of independent rule and a sense of national identity that predates our own. Morocco's citizens are relatively free of the xenophobic tendencies which were the "colonial legacy" of Iran and most other Islamic states.

In the assessment of Richard Parker, former U.S. Ambassador to Morocco, it's conceivable that the Moroccan

people, with their relatively abundant resources and relatively progressive attitudes, could be mobilized to cope with current economic problems and the absorption crisis which looms ahead. [Ref. 46: p. 164] It would mean that King Hassan would have to become as concerned with solving his people's problems as he has been with keeping himself on the throne. It's impossible to predict Hassan's approach to meeting these challenges, but there is one clear lesson that can be drawn from Iran. Only King Hassan can make the critical decisions that will determine his country's future. There may not be much external powers can do to influence the outcome. There is probably not much they should do.

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